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TECHNOLOGY-BASED?




Environmental controls in the United States are often said to be “technol-
ogy-based” because the polluter’s duties are determined by the available technol-
ogy for controlling that pollution rather than by the social costs and benefits of
doing so. Indeed, this is much of what distinguishes U.S. environmental law post-
1970 from that which preceded it. But technology-based standards have in fact
weighed the costs of controlling pollution in unique, often obscure ways, yielding
an analysis that defies standardization and basic notions of transparency. Often
lumped under an umbrella heading called “feasibility” analysis and justified on
the grounds that it avoids many of the known pitfalls of cost-benefit analysis, the
factoring of cost into technology assessments hands our Environmental Protection
Agency a uniquely hard problem of prediction: the inducement of innovation.
This Article traces the evolution of the practice to the state of the art today, offers
several clarifications upon reflection, and suggests that cost estimation in technol-
ogy-based standard setting is actually more likely to be a useful decision input
than the orthodox cost-benefit balancing procedures. Most importantly, it is more
likely to accurately assess the possibilities of inducing innovation—accuracy that is
increasingly vital to meeting environmental challenges like climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
Pollution control standards in the U.S. are prototypically some function
of the solutions that are “available” or “achievable,” not of how much pollu-
tion is optimal in balancing benefits and costs. This has long drawn econo-
mists’ ire because optimizing benefits and costs just sounds rational.1
Indeed, if the allure of the American approach has been its embodiment of a
“best efforts” mandate to reduce pollution at manageable cost,2 it can di-
verge considerably from the broadest accounts of economic efficiency.3 The
Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act (CWA) together impose more
than a dozen requirements that polluters control to the degree the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (or its delegate) finds achievable,
and many other statutes add requirements as well.4 Variation is the norm,
but the core feature of such “technology-based” standards is that they con-
strain independent of environmental benefit or of marginal cost—at least to
a degree.5 This is what makes a pollution standard technology-based. Yet
most of these mandates reach for solutions that are, in some sense, cost-
available to the regulated parties—an indefinite qualification further com-
plicating an already complex regulatory tool.6 Indeed, the intersection of
cost and technology in these settings has been uniquely problematic given
the dynamic properties of a mature economy.7 The question has long been
whether or not such policies can improve the technologies of production and
1. “Cost-benefit” balancing has a deep history in government. See THEODORE M.
PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 148-90
(1997). In its more informal versions cost-benefit balancing might even seem to epitomize
practical reason. See, e.g., White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1260-63
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). But the recent turn toward formal, profession-
alized cost-benefit analysis in regulation has provoked a pointed and well-developed opposi-
tion. See Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 93
(2015); infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text. R
2. See, e.g., JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 26 (1977); ALLEN V.
KNEESE & CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 51-57, 69-84 (1975).
3. Cf. David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: Welfare Eco-
nomics Meets Organizational Design, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 154 (2015) (“Unweighted cost-
benefit analysis is a command to maximize efficiency.”); see also Note, Technology-Based Emis-
sion and Effluent Standards and the Achievement of Ambient Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE
L.J. 792, 793 (1982) (critiquing CAA and CWA for their supposed inefficiencies).
4. See infra notes 54-149 and accompanying text. R
5. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. R
6. See infra notes 178-207 and accompanying text. R
7. See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 93-135
(2003); see infra notes 209-214 and accompanying text. R
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consumption.8 Despite sustained and eclectic efforts, it has evaded rigorous
answer.9
Orthodox economics has long emphasized the importance of technolog-
ical change to productivity gains.10 But the constant search for innovations
maximizing profits—or minimizing costs—confounds straight-line thinking.
The conventional methods have routinely over-estimated regulation
costs11—so much so that deeper questions surrounding their concept of
cost12 are at least implicated.13 Indeed, several critiques14 have sustained
widespread skepticism of those methods’ overall justification.15 Costs may
necessarily be something to avoid, but which costs are worth avoiding has
8. See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39
REV. ECON. & STATS. 312 (1957); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT (1934).
9. See Wesley M. Cohen, Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and Per-
formance, in 1 HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 129, 134-35 (Bronwyn H. Hall &
Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010); Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of
Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1059, 1062-66
(Richard Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989); NATHAN ROSENBERG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX:
TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS (1982).
10. See, e.g., J. Fred Weston, The Profit Concept and Theory: A Restatement, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 152, 155 (1954) (calling innovations and exogenous changes two principal determinants
of uncertainty and uncertainty the principal source of profits).
11. In one noted ex post assessment of regulatory cost estimates, Harrington and col-
leagues found that costs were much more likely to be over- than under-estimated because
most of the analyses studied “ignore[d] the possibility of technological innovation. . . . Tech-
nical change is, after all, notoriously difficult to forecast; all that can be said with confidence,
based on historical experience, is that the cost of compliance will likely decline, but no one
can say at what rate.” Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates,
19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 309 (2000). Cost over-estimations in regulatory impact
analyses (RIAs) were first revealed by retrospective studies some two decades ago. See, e.g.,
Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environ-
mental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998-99 (1998) (finding vast overestimation of costs
in influential studies attributable to dubious assumptions about cost avoidance); Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 1998 (1998) (same).
12. For a critical, full spectrum account of economics’ orthodoxy and its deepening
methodological troubles, see TONY LAWSON, ECONOMICS AND REALITY (1997); TONY LAWSON,
REORIENTING ECONOMICS (2003); see also MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 1-8 (5th
ed. 1997). “[T]he striking fact about the history of economics is how often economists have
violated both their own and later methodological prescriptions.” Id. at 690. On the specific
problem of a theory of cost, see Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUDS. 1 (1982).
13. See infra notes 215-231 and accompanying text. R
14. See, e.g., R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24
REV. ECON. STUDS. 11 (1956) (showing a convergence of critiques of welfare economics op-
timization and concluding that departing from any of its conditions in response can entail
suspending all of them to improve anyone’s welfare).
15. See Sinden, supra note 1, at 104-08 (noting there are many issues in assigning val- R
ues, such as monetizing nonmarket goods and the declining value of money).
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grown unremittingly contested in economics.16 In the view of many, inno-
vation is a principal source of the uncertainty.17 Prevailing orthodoxy casts
technological change as an autonomous function of time—immune to policy
change. Yet costs in business are the enemy of profits. If they can be
avoided by technical progress, that will be the firm’s pursuit.18 Thus, for as
long as technology-based standards have been condemned for their ineffi-
ciencies, it has been conceded that they might ultimately achieve superior
cost minimization simply by inducing innovation.19 And as cost-benefit
analysis has shouldered more duties in our administrative state, innovation’s
role in cost factoring has become its foil.20
The unfocused approach we have taken to this nexus has left too much
to chance. Technology-based standard setting is as far from a theory of
inducing innovation today as it was four decades ago.21 This article makes
the case that technology-based standards, though still a bit of a muddle, can
create clearer paths to consensus actions on long-lived, broad-scale environ-
mental challenges like climate change. Were it finally to resolve some basic
assumptions and methodological priors, induced cost-avoidance might be able
to navigate the uncertainties mentioned above in ways far superior to ortho-
dox cost-benefit analysis.22 Especially in bigger picture cost factoring, e.g.,
the social costs of carbon, this misapprehension of cost is becoming an ur-
gent problem in the pursuit of environmental quality.23 Equilibrium model-
16. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471,
1483-87 (2013).
17. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. R
18. Pursuing, of course, is not the same thing as attaining. See infra notes 210-14 and R
accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Note, Technology-Based, supra note 3, at 799 (“It is conceivable that a pollu- R
tion abatement program that is not cost-effective in the short run could produce least-cost
long-term results by forcing the development of superior abatement technology, and thereby
minimizing the aggregate long-term costs of compliance with environmental regulations.”);
KNEESE & SCHULTZE, supra note 2, at 82 (“Over the long haul, perhaps the most important R
single criterion on which to judge environmental policies is the extent to which they spur
new technology toward the efficient conservation of environmental quality.”).
20. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80
TEX. L. REV. 531, 547 (2002) (“Despite the attention given to innovation and regulation . . .
there is surprisingly little empirical support for the proposition that either [pollution] trad-
ing or [conventional] regulation actually leads to continuous and systematic innovation.”).
21. To be sure, design, performance and goal standards all allocate freedoms differently
and can make real differences in markets for innovation. Because the technology-based stan-
dards examined herein overwhelmingly take the form of performance standards, however, we
contrast that form with other, more immediately market-facing tools like taxes and
allowances.
22. See infra notes 277-99 and accompanying text.
23. See NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING & MEDICINE, REPORT—VALUING
CLIMATE DAMAGES: UPDATING ESTIMATION OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON DIOXIDE 3-11 (2017).
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ing of policy costs and benefits lacks even a modicum of accuracy if we
cannot predict the direction or pace of technological innovations rearrang-
ing costs and benefits over whatever interval is in question.24
Part I argues that the economics of inducing innovation has failed to
yield any general guidance regarding regulatory choice while Part II in-
troduces what little legal doctrine governs our technology-based approach.
Part III sets out the microeconomics of production and what we should be
looking for in understanding cost-availability. Finally, Part IV uses two re-
cent case studies to test some of the observations made in Parts II and III.
I. AN ECONOMICS OF INDUCING INNOVATION?
The economist John Hicks first hypothesized “induced innovation,” i.e.,
that “a change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a
spur to invention, and to invention of a particular kind—directed to econo-
mizing the use of a factor which has become relatively expensive.”25 Hicks
spoke of labor costs. But scarcity—or, really, production constraints of any
kind—can provide the inducement.26 Orthodox economics views factors of
production like labor and capital as fungible27 and this has long complicated
its very notion of cost.28 Vital inputs like energy services sometimes fluctu-
ate wildly in price to negligible overall effect.29 Still, if innovation can be
induced, the costs of regulation become a cryptic target. Since 2000, EPA’s
24. Typically, probabilities are used to round out any model’s parameters—decisions
that not even economists can agree make much sense. See Itzhak Gilboa et al., Probability and
Uncertainty in Economic Modeling, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 173 (2008); Martin L. Weitzman, On
Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STATS.
1, 2-6 (2009). The more parameterized any cost estimation, the more likely it is to make
internally contradictory assumptions about human behavior, markets, information flows, and,
ultimately, about innovation itself. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text. R
25. JOHN R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 124-25 (1932).
26. See, e.g., JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1981) (arguing that scarcity ac-
cesses the most vital of all resources—human ingenuity).
27. See R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AMER. ECON. REV. 713,
713-14 (1992). Note, though, that production factors are often not divisible or substitutable.
See Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Economics of Production, 60 AM . ECON. REV. 1, 8-9
(1970); see infra note 229 and accompanying text. R
28. Depending on whether the focus is social utility and welfare, production/consump-
tion functions, the theory of choice, or something else, economics’ concept of “cost” bears
very different meanings. See I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1957).
The term “social cost” has long fared even worse. See Frank H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the
Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582, 584 (1924); Donald H. Regan, The Problem of
Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1972); infra note 165 and accompanying text. R
29. See David Popp et al., Energy, the Environment, and Technological Change, in 2 HAND-
BOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 873, 874, 883 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg
eds., 2010).
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own general guidance on “economic” analysis has acknowledged the di-
lemma that estimating the costs that will result from any regulation entails
estimating future technical change.30 If firms can adjust their factors of pro-
duction in response to external constraints, then the longer the time horizon
in the estimate, the more likely it should include cost-avoidance efforts by
affected firms.31 Even during the earliest work on technology-based stan-
dard setting, this influence on the market for innovation that the standard
itself exerts was a serious issue.32 It has remained so ever since.33
Consider a hypothetical industry sector, X, comprised of three firms.
One firm, A, is relatively diversified, having three lines of business, X, Y,
and Z. A second firm, B, has only two of those business lines, X and Y. A
third firm, C, is only in the business of X. Now suppose that, at prevailing
prices, A’s two profitable lines of business are Y and Z but that it is losing
money on X; that B’s only profitable business is X; and that C is just break-
ing even. (In some sense, B is outcompeting A and C (as to X).)
Assuming these firms comprise industry sector X and assuming the sec-
tor faces a new production constraint like a pollution control measure, any
projection of the sector’s costs will be uncertain—perhaps deeply so. The
economic orthodoxy assumes that innovation allowing X’s production by
nonpolluting means minimizes “social” costs while regulation protecting
those X is polluting merely transfers costs.34 A “static” analysis of the situa-
tion, though, does not even approximate an account of X as a competitive
30. Cf. U.S. EPA, EPA 240-R-00-003, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES
124-25 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 GUIDELINES], (acknowledging that “[b]enefit-cost models
must predict what actions firms are likely to choose when attempting to comply with a new
policy and what the compliance costs of those actions will be” but that those are likely to
overestimate costs because firms can substitute away from the burdened production factors).
31. See U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 2010 8.3.1.1 (rev. ed.
2014) (2010) [hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES]. Similar treatments of the issue date to the 2000
GUIDELINES—despite their supposedly exhaustive coverage. Cf. Michael A. Livermore, Cost-
Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 609, 645 (2014) (noting that
the “guidelines adopted by EPA in 2000 represented the first genuinely complete benefit-
cost manual” and that “peer review played an important role” in their development).
32. See Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation,
9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 420-22 (1985); KNEESE & SCHULTZE, supra note 2, at 82 (“Any R
attempt to specify the costs of reducing air and water pollution is handicapped by the need to
make some assumptions about technology.”).
33. Cf. Adam M. Finkel, The Cost of Nothing Trumps the Value of Everything: The Failure
of Regulatory Economics to Keep Pace with Improvements in Quantitative Risk Analysis, 4 MICH. J.
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 91, 119 (2014) (“[R]isks are elusive, but at least they are not capable of
intentionally changing their size, whereas costs can increase or decrease strategically and
perhaps even in response to being studied!”).
34. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 126-30 (19th ed.
2009); E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 99-118 (5th ed. 2007); CHARLES D.
KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 271-72 (1999).
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sector over time.35 Competition entails minimizing costs.36 Regulation ad-
ding costs to X’s production might spur (1) consolidation, e.g., A and C
sellout to B; (2) a market contraction, e.g., demand decreases from a price
increase; (3) innovations reordering A, B, and/or C’s factors of production;
(4) new entrants replacing the incumbents; or (5) some combination of the
above. A law putting A out of the business, however, saves A its operating
losses from X.37 A law compelling A, B, and C to buy a solution owned by D
makes D profits.38 And a duty that is cheaper for C to fulfill than A and B
could allow C to outcompete them. So which of the foregoing will actually
minimize all “costs”? Which is more probable in context? Should the costs
of producing X be considered on average or at the margin? When should we
evaluate them and for what interval? How competitive is X? Can any of the
incumbents pass along added costs through a price increase? Despite the
prevalence of its own technology-based standard-setting duties and decades
of experience with estimating costs, EPA’s generic guidance on “economic”
analysis offers no insight into these questions. The vast majority of its
35. See Coase, supra note 27, at 717-18 (observing that moving from a zero transaction R
cost world to the real world instantly highlights legal entitlements, transaction costs, extant
industrial organization, and other distortions); BURTON H. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS 20-24
(1977) (contrasting static and dynamic conceptions of efficiency); Herbert Hovenkamp, Ra-
tionality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 306-09 (1992) (applying Coase’s
hypotheses to bilateral monopoly contexts with results diverging from fictionalized accounts
of perfectly competitive, equilibrating markets). EPA’s most recent manual steers its analysts
to “partial” equilibrium analysis, i.e., the use of firms’ compliance costs as the principal deter-
minant of a regulation’s “social costs,” over what it casts as the more onerous “general” equi-
librium analysis whenever “the scope of a regulation is limited to a single sector, or to a small
number of sectors.” See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at § 8. Even that more limited form R
of inquiry should take account of cost avoidance, though.
36. See ALFRED MARSHALL, 1 PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 328-68 (1890) (explaining increas-
ing vertical integration as larger firms’ capacities to minimize costs and maximize returns to
scale); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 308 (1921) (arguing that the entrepre-
neur is paid “the remainder out of the value realized from the sale of product after the
deduction of the values of all factors in production which can be valued”); ARTHUR C. PIGOU,
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 329-35 (4th ed. 1952) (so-called externalities are externalized just
to enhance profitability); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUS-
TAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 62-118 (1985) (focusing on firm costs).
37. In this connection it is illustrative that standard cost-benefit analysis wavers over
the characterization of job losses as costs or benefits. See Ann E. Ferris & Al McGartland, A
Research Agenda for Improving the Treatment of Employment Impacts in Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 170, 170-72 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2013).
38. See Ashford et al., supra note 32, at 427. Profit should not exist in the world of R
equilibrium economics—even though it surely is what motivates real economic actors. See
Weston, supra note 10, at 154 (calling profit a “nonfunctional” component of the standard R
theory); see infra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
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source literature is of the simple “cost-of-compliance” variety.39 The vague-
ness of the economic concept of cost, coupled with the deep uncertainties of
inducing innovation, may explain EPA’s reticence.40 But this should no
longer suffice in a climate where regulation’s costs loom so large.
The bulk of the work at this front has aimed to show that one type of
regulatory tool or another is a better inducement to innovation and, thus,
net social cost minimization.41 But if cost estimation is as dependent upon
the time slices and contexts under study as suggested above, then necessa-
rily there is some chance that any environmental control might be innova-
tion-inducing, at least a priori.42 Consider three standard tools: Rule 1
prohibiting pollution above a set mass per unit of output;43 Rule 2 taxing
39. See William A. Pizer & Raymond Kopp, Calculating the Costs of Environmental Regu-
lation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1307, 1311-19 (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jef-
frey R. Vincent eds., 2005). EPA’s separation of “partial” equilibrium (wherein sectoral
compliance costs are proxies for social costs) from “general” equilibrium approaches (wherein
distortions like regulation are eventually assimilated into a wider economic equilibrium) is
unalloyed to any indication of which is more likely correct in given circumstances. See 2010
GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at § 8.1. The source literature on which EPA relied noted that R
estimating technological change was the “most challenging” future work in estimating regula-
tion’s costs and that, though much more common, “partial” equilibrium analyses are generally
inferior to “general” equilibrium analysis. See Pizer & Kopp, supra note 39, at 1343-44. Pizer
and Kopp dismiss the “engineering approach” described below as “problematic when applied
on a broad scale.” Id. at 1312. Yet they also admit that partial equilibrium analysis is “wrong”
when it misses “general equilibrium changes in output and prices and miss[es] potential
welfare changes from altered production levels and distortions in other markets.” Id. at 1326.
40. Cf. Finkel, supra note 33, at 118-21 (describing a general problem, with EPA in- R
cluded, of a failure or refusal to report uncertainties in cost estimates); Cooter, supra note 12, R
at 20-24 (arguing that costs accrued from trading cannot be estimated accurately without
first knowing the strategic nature of the situation).
41. See Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmen-
tal Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 319-25, 347-62 (1998) (summarizing literature). In
fact, neoclassical economics’ attention to environmental policy has remained anchored to a
caricature of technology-forcing standards and the claim that they are not efficiency-
maximizing.
42. See Yoram Bauman et al., Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal
Abatement Costs? Some Theory, Algebraic Evidence and Policy Implications, 40 ENVTL. RESOURCE
ECON. 507 (2008); DRIESEN, supra note 7, at 49-71; Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, R
When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency
of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 892-909
(1999); KOLSTAD, supra note 34, at 139-46; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE R
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 160-69 (2d ed. 1988); Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Envi-
ronmental Regulation on Innovation, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (1979). The related but dis-
tinct claim that regulatory costs tend to be offset by cost-savings which are prompted in the
process, see Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Envi-
ronment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 100-05 (1995), is examined below.
See infra note 185 and accompanying text. R
43. See infra notes 54-149 and accompanying text. R
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pollution by masses discharged;44 and Rule 3 issuing tradeable pollution al-
lowances to the polluting firms.45 Let us now assume B is the least polluting
incumbent. Any of these three tools could conceivably put one/all of the
incumbents out of the X business quickly or over time and that could
change the dynamics considerably.46 (Even diversified firms are typically
positioned to subsidize losing lines of business for only so long and upstart
E could always out-innovate {A, B, C . . .}.) Rule 3 has remained the focus
because, assuming B’s willingness to sell, A and C might compete for B’s
excess allowances.47 But why presume B’s willingness to sell to A or C?48
Rules 2 or 3 might induce A, C, or someone else to innovate, but so might
Rule 1—and more directly. Indeed, any of the rules could, depending on
omitted variables or contestable assumptions, prompt a search for new
means of producing X without the pollution.49 What will result in fact is
too often unknowable a priori.50 Part II introduces the technology-based
approach to answering these questions beyond the a priori.
44. See William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM . ECON.
REV. 307 (1972).
45. See J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND ECO-
NOMICS (1968).
46. This is necessarily an empirical question. See generally Malloy, supra note 20, at 541- R
51. Where Pigovian taxes can easily fail to match incentives with their underlying pur-
pose(s). See Peter A. Diamond, Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Corrective Pricing, 4
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 526 (1973) (proof demonstrating that corrective taxes often fail
to improve welfare given real variabilities) changing what had been a social norm to what is,
in effect, a “price” can dramatically alter the expected behaviors. See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo
Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
47. Dales’ proposal of a tool like our Rule 3 has dominated the literature on inducing
innovation in pollution control. See DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION & PROPERTY: COMPARING OWN-
ERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 130-53 (2002).
48. B could easily envision doing better with A and C going defunct. Or it might sell
these rights to A or C’s neighbors. Finally, B might reserve these rights on the (mistaken)
assumption that their value will increase over time. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & David T.
Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM . ECON. REV. 267 (1983).
49. See DRIESEN, supra note 7, at 193-201. Whether the search ultimately benefits regu- R
lated incumbents, their vendor(s), or an upstart competitor, the cost outcome is the same—
unless (as is often done) asymmetric assumptions are made about the subject markets. See,
e.g., Magat, supra note 42, at 18 (“To the extent that a regulatory agency mandates the wide- R
spread adoption of a new technology developed by a firm, the agency creates a widely-
expanded market for that firm’s innovation. However, given the inherent difficulty in appro-
priating the benefits from new abatement technology . . . it is highly unlikely that this
incentive to innovate could dominate the other disincentives for abatement technology
innovation.”).
50. In their defense of cost-benefit balancing in financial regulation, Posner and Weyl
answer this indictment by acknowledging that all regulations “have complex causal effects”
and, thus, that all forms of cost estimation are in the same boat, roughly speaking. See Eric
A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criti-
cisms, 124 YALE L.J.F. 246, 251 (2015). Part IV argues that this may not be the case.
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II. TECHNOLOGY’S COST-AVAILABILITY: A UNIQUE QUESTION
A series of Supreme Court holdings construing the CAA and CWA
have made it abundantly clear that how EPA may, must, or must not factor
the cost of its standards into those standards is some function of ad hoc
statutory interpretation as overseen by the judiciary and the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB).51 The executive discretion embodied in these
mandates (with others) has long invited various forms of cost-benefit bal-
ancing which, since the 1980s, has been carried out by EPA pursuant to a
series of executive orders.52 Still, if all “costs” were equivalent before the
law, technology’s cost-availability would be just another entry in an overall
cost-benefit accounting. And that is assuredly not the law.53 This part sum-
marizes what little legal doctrine has emerged distinguishing technology’s
cost-availability from cost-benefit optimization. Section A raises the CAA’s
key practices and Section B the CWA’s.
A. The Clean Air Act: Identifying Cost-Available Control
Solutions
There is some reason to think that if cost is not expressly included in a
CAA standard-setting provision where other factors are named, that it
should be excluded from the decision-making.54 But in almost five decades,
no generic principles have emerged by which the technological possibilities
for targeted pollutants or their costs may or must be analyzed Act-wide.55
51. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Costs into Account: Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial
and Agency Discretion, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87 (2016). In this regard, an earlier hope for
general “default principles” has dimmed considerably. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit De-
fault Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1667-68 (2001) (propounding five default principles
for use with Chevron deference in deciding whether agencies may, must, or must not take
cost into account). The Court has made this clear with respect to other statutes, too, most
notably the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See Indus. Union Dep’t., AFL-CIO v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490 (1981). This study is limited to the CAA and CWA.
52. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALY-
SIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013).
53. See, e.g., EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 (1980); Chem. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 129-33 (1985); Patricia Ross McCubbin,
The Risk in Technology-Based Standards, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 6-29 (2005).
54. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 465-68 (2001) (concluding the
analysis of cost as a factor in setting ambient air quality standards by remarking that “Con-
gress . . . does not hide elephants in mouseholes”); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 532-33 (2007); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 374 F.3d 1363, 1372-73 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
55. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (concluding that, under
the circumstances and as to the exact language in CAA § 112(n)(1)(A), the choice of regulat-
ing only if “appropriate and necessary” must include some weighing of “cost”); see also Train
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Of course, technological possibilities and cost have remained tightly linked
in the CAA. The CAA, like the CWA, has often been called “technology
forcing.”56 And the late tug-of-war on the Supreme Court over when costs
may or must be factored into various CAA determinations57 has provoked a
voluminous literature that too often conflates technology’s cost-availability
with overall cost-minimization. While that tug-of-war remains unresolved,58
it seems unlikely to end in a mandate for plain efficiency maximization.59
Thus, a few basic points of departure stand out.60
CAA standards demanding that pollution be abated to the degree the
“available” or “achievable” technology permits include CAA § 111’s new
source performance standards (NSPSs),61 CAA § 112’s national emission
standards for “hazardous air pollutants” (HAPs),62 CAA § 129’s solid waste
incinerator standards,63 CAA’s § 165’s preconstruction requirements,64 CAA
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 90-91 (1975) (noting a lower court’s holding that
denying variances was a way the CAA aimed to “force” the development of technology); Int’l
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that in finding a
technology will be “available” when required EPA cannot engage in a “‘crystal ball’ inquiry”
over sound projections that extant technology can be adopted at acceptable cost, can work,
and can work reliably).
56. See Train, 421 U.S. at 91; see also D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal
Environmental Standards Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 773-74 (1977); Note, Forcing
Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713 (1979). Much of the “technology-
forcing” talk of the 1970s was about the CAA’s ambient environmental quality goals.
57. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Gen., L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1606-07 (2014)
(holding EPA may consider costs of abatement in determining which upwind states “contrib-
ute significantly” to downwind nonattainment); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (holding that
EPA must afford “at least some attention to cost” in determining whether it is “appropriate
and necessary” to regulate electricity generating boilers’ pollution).
58. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707; EME Homer City, 134 S. Ct. at 1603-06; Massa-
chusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-35.
59. But cf. Richard L. Revesz, Toward a More Rational Environmental Policy, 39 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 93, 105-06 (2015) (arguing that both EME Homer City and Michigan, in light
of several practical obstacles, aim at cost-minimizing regulation).
60. EPA’s 2000 manual cites the executive orders on regulatory impact analysis (RIA)
(among others) as their impetus, see 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 30, at 5-7, and does not R
generally distinguish cost-availability analysis from cost evaluations required for RIAs. Id.
OMB’s general guidance, Circular A-4, at least includes the generic disclaimer that “[w]hen a
statute establishes a specific regulatory requirement and the agency is considering a more
stringent standard, you should examine the benefits and cost of reasonable alternatives that
reflect the range of the agency’s statutory discretion, including the specific statutory require-
ment.” See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, § C (2003), https://www.white
house.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 7429(a)(2).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a).
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§ 173’s nonattainment permit requirements,65 CAA § 111(d)’s residual ex-
isting source standards,66 CAA § 202(a)(3)’s new motor vehicle standards,67
CAA § 211’s reformulated gasoline standards for nonattainment areas,68 and
CAA § 407(b)’s nitrogen oxides utility boiler controls.69 The practical ac-
cessibility of various input, process, and/or capital changes has yielded a
tangled web of precedents construing these mandates.
Where cost is a choice factor, distinctions typically emerge between
potential solutions based on their (perceived) practicality.70 Several com-
mon confusions usually follow not far behind. For a standard of perform-
ance to be practicable or cost-available it must somehow be within the
financial reach of the targeted polluter(s). Cost-availability of this kind can
be estimated with respect to a single firm, facility, or stack—or it can be
estimated as to whole industrial sectors.71 What is cost-available on average
across a whole sector obviously differs from that of a single facility or firm.
Regardless of whether the fit is from site-to-solution or from sector-to-solu-
tion where site idiosyncrasies are ignored,72 cost avoidance remains the focal
concern.73
65. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501(3), 7503(a). CAA § 172 also requires all implementation
plans in nonattainment areas to require “reasonably available control technology” of all ex-
isting sources. Id. at § 7502(c)(1).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(A).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651f(b)(1).
70. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Gen., L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1603-06; Sierra
Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 877-80 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d
404, 410-11 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. V. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 944-47
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. EPA, 325 F.3d 374, 377-79 (D.C. Cir.2003); Nat’l Petro-
leum Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1139-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Husqvarna AB v.
EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 629-32
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 800-03 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Geo. E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 428-34 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 328-32 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,
429-34 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387-88, 391-92 (D. C. Cir.
1973); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 622-28, 641-43 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. In our example above, an end-of-pipe widget at C’s X facility (which is just break-
ing even at prevailing prices) could be cost-unavailable while still being deemed cost-availa-
ble when averaged across the whole sector {A, B, C . . .}.
72. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text. R
73. For example, EPA’s approach to BACT reviews under CAA § 165(a)(2) has long
taken the form of a “top-down method” wherein all possible control techniques are arrayed
from most to least effective and assigned to the permit applicant based on an assessment of
its financial and other capabilities. See John-Mark Stensvaag, Preventing Significant Deteriora-
tion Under the Clean Air Act: The BACT Determination—Part I, 41 ENVTL. L. REP . 11101, 11105
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA103.txt unknown Seq: 13 27-MAR-18 15:51
Fall 2017] Cost Factoring in U.S. Environmental Standards 95
In Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus,74 the court construed the
CAA’s notion of “available technology” which is “adequately demonstrated”
in an NSPS to reach solutions reasonably projected to be available when the
standard was to come into effect.75 One leading casebook called this the
“margin for striving,” while also observing that later cases left little of that
margin to EPA.76 Because EPA typically formats NSPSs by pollutant
masses,77 the cost-availability of any conceivable solution can bear on
whether the standard is “achievable.”78 This can mean amending inputs as
readily as it can one’s process or capital.79 In its 2015 NSPS for greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from electric utility generating units (EGUs), for
(2011). Eliminating as “technically infeasible” any option identified by this method has more
to do with the applicant’s finances than any other consideration. See John-Mark Stensvaag,
Preventing Significant Deterioration Under the Clean Air Act: The BACT Determination—Part II,
42 ENVTL. L. REP . 10024, 10037 (2012).
74. Portland Cement Assoc. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
75. Id. at 391-92. After remanding EPA’s standard for failing adequately to collect and
analyze existing plant data, the panel reiterated its invitation to EPA that it approach
“achievability” not by surveying extant industrial arrangements but rather by “extrapolations
. . . and on testimony from experts and vendors made part of the record.” Id. at 402; see also
Essex Chem. Corp., 486 F.2d at 433. Yet, puzzlingly, the same court also held that “availa-
ble,” “demonstrated” technology was concretely proven technology. See Essex Chem. Corp. at
433 (“An adequately demonstrated system is one which has been shown to be reasonably
reliable, reasonably efficient, and which can reasonably be expected to serve the interests of
pollution control without becoming exorbitantly costly in an economic or environmental
way.”).
76. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 483-84
(7th ed. 2015) (citing Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
77. The CAA and CWA both allow standards to take multiple forms. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7602(k) (defining emission limitation and standard to include “a requirement . . . which
limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis,
including any requirement relating to the operation or maintenance of a source to assure
continuous emission reduction, and any design, equipment, work practice or operational
standard”); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (defining effluent limitation to mean “any restriction estab-
lished . . . on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological and other
constituents which are discharged from point sources . . . including schedules of
compliance”).
78. Cf. Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (calling
industry’s argument that another input/process besides EPA’s focal metric for setting the
standard was “self-defeating” because that technique’s availability might render use of EPA’s
more expensive means unnecessary).
79. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Sierra
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 368-73 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Essex Chem. Corp., 486 F.2d at 433.
The courts have formulated the standard for weighing costs variously. See Lignite Energy, 198
F.3d at 933 (“exorbitant”); Costle, 657 F.2d at 383 (not “excessive” or “unreasonable”); New
York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Because section 111 does not set forth
the weight that should be assigned to [its] factors, we have granted the agency a great degree
of discretion in balancing them.”).
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example, EPA claimed that the courts had endorsed the use of an NSPS to
advantage—or at least to not disadvantage—nascent technologies not yet
widely “demonstrated” in the industry.80 Indeed, the original NSPS for
coal-fired EGUs (long featured in the mountains of literature touting “flexi-
ble” tools) permitted either fuel switching or add-on equipment as individ-
ual circumstances dictated.81 All the same, an NSPS can mean sectoral
consolidation.82 NSPS ‘availability’ is sector-based83 and, once set, applies
only to that sector.84
NSPSs were also where EPA first helped individual sources delay the
applicability of a sectoral standard indefinitely if their facility updates did
not result in new or increased emissions.85 Providing that safe harbor, EPA
maintained, would encourage innovations inside existing facilities’ fence
lines.86 Ironically enough, this very set of assumptions gave us the Chevron
80. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
64,510, 64,537-41 (2015) [hereinafter Final EGU NSPS], (citing Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). This argument entangled EPA in construing a definition of
“standard of performance” which Congress twice amended, first to include and then to ex-
clude a set percentage threshold of emission reductions (instead of set cost thresholds). See
id. at 64537 & n.124. At issue in the EGU GHG NSPS was the “availability” of “carbon
capture and sequestration technology.” See infra notes 252-71 and accompanying text. EPA
estimated that its 1971 NSPS added an average of 15.8% in capital costs to the average plant
and noted that the courts found that determination “reasonable.” See Final EGU NSPS, 80
Fed. Reg. at 64,559-60.
81. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
82. Cf. Lignite Energy Council, 198 F.3d at 935 (upholding EPA’s use of sector-wide
estimate of efficiencies on the grounds that EPA was setting a sector-based standard). This
will often entail EPA’s use of a sector’s “baseline” data as available. See, e.g., Nat’l Asphalt
Pavement Ass’n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting industry’s argument
that many facilities had installed control technology reducing their emissions after the 1967
study on which EPA relied as having “no merit” because EPA used the study to quantify the
uncontrolled emissions in the sector).
83. See Nat’l Asphalt, 539 F.2d at 786 (noting intervenor firm’s claim that EPA’s focal
“control technologies can be installed and operated at reasonable cost” and that many facili-
ties were prepared to install them); see also Costle, 657 F.2d at 330.
84. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 633-37 (5th Cir. 1981) (NSPS for
steam generating electric utility boilers not applicable to cogeneration “waste heat” boiler).
85. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 328-30 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (invalidating
flexible “bubble concept” used to define “stationary source” and “modification” for purposes
of NSPS applicability on grounds that NSPSs themselves must be set taking cost of technol-
ogy into account and because the record did not prove that the flexibility would lead to
greater improvements than broad applicability of NSPSs); New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 11-
18 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reviewing history of EPA’s definition of “stationary source” and
“modification”).
86. Cf. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 725-28 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(rejecting EPA’s reasoning for its “bubble concept”), rev’d sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 853-59 (1984). EPA had no proof that innovation
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doctrine87 and now leads routinely to ‘arbitrariness’ review, especially as to
the record EPA compiles and the search it conducts.88 Its own core gui-
dance document, the Air Pollution Control Cost Manual, teaches its personnel
that some control equipment investments are so large that vendor data is
meaningless even if obtained because the influences on “total capital invest-
ment” at some installations are so numerous and diverse that vendors must
“design, fabricate, and construct each control according to the specific needs
of the facility.”89
Another set of sectoral standards, the “maximum achievable control
technology” (MACT) standards for HAPs, consists firstly of “minimum
stringency” primary standards. For new sources, these standards track the
performance of the single best-controlled source in that category.90 For ex-
isting sources, they track an average of the best performing sources for
which information can be obtained.91 Cost has become an excluded factor in
setting these so-called “MACT floors.”92 Yet with those floors set, EPA
then determines, taking cost and other factors into account, whether any
better performance is “achievable” in that category (or subcategory)93 and, if
would be encouraged by its “bubble” concept. Indeed, the market in question—wholesale
electricity—seemed well suited to existing facilities being able to outcompete the NSPS-
controlled “new” facilities. The Supreme Court instead treated it as a question of statutory
construction. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858, 863-66.
87. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 260-69 (2014).
88. See, e.g., New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1150-54 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Nat’l
Asphalt Pavement Ass’n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1431 (9th Cir. 1988); Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp.
v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 636 (2d Cir. 1976).
89. See U.S. EPA, EPA/452/B-02-001, EPA AIR POLLUTION CONTROL COST MANUAL,
§ 2.5.4.1 (6th ed. 2002). This led to proposals of a “bubble concept” for water pollution
control standards for a time too. See Emily L. Sherwin, The Bubble Concept in Water Pollution
Control, 60 B.U. L. REV. 686, 695-96 (1980).
90. CAA § 112 MACT is unconventionally structured into two parallel provisions,
§ 112(d)(2) and § 112(d)(3), both of which pertain to new and existing sources, each of which
defining its own type of stringency anchored in the notion of “achievable.” See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7412(d)(2)-(3); Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 861 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
91. Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(d)(2)-(d)(3)) (describing MACT floors as “minimum stringency” standards that are
then followed up by “beyond-the-floor” standards EPA deems “achievable”); ROBERT J. MARTI-
NEAU, JR., Hazardous Air Pollutants, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 227, 246-47 (Robert J.
Martineau, Jr. & Robert P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004).
92. See Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
Nat’l Lime Ass’n, 233 F.3d at 640.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2); Nat’l Ass’n for Surface Finishing v. EPA, 795 F.3d 1, 4-5
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
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so, sets a “beyond-the-floor” secondary standard balancing costs against
those other factors.94
MACT’s compound approach has also been interpreted to mean achiev-
able “under most adverse circumstances which can reasonably be expected to
recur,”95 a qualification that has complicated this already complex kind of
standard still further.96 The earliest judicial use of this hard luck gloss on
achievability, International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus,97 is remembered today
for the judges’ “diffident”98 reweighing of the evidence at the behest of
incumbent firms crying foul that only one of them could meet EPA’s stan-
dard and then only in good conditions.99 Today, EPA’s discretion to set the
parameters of its search for solutions usually insulates this sort of inquiry
from searching review.100 (And firms calling an achievability finding into
94. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1055, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2014). If,
“taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air
quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements, [EPA] determines [su-
perior performance] is achievable for new or existing sources in the category or subcategory
to which such emission standard applies,” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2), EPA may set a more
stringent limit beyond the “minimum stringency” MACT floor.
95. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Nat’l Lime
Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 431 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Cement Kiln Recycling
Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Sierra Club’s recourse to National Lime, a
CAA § 111 new source performance standard challenge, ignored the fact that the two
“achievability” thresholds functioned very differently in their respective standards. Cf. U.S.
Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 606-10 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (distinguishing between what
has been “achieved” and what is “achievable”). Nat’l Lime’s full account of CAA § 111
achievability was that [t]he statutory standard is one of achievability, given costs. Some
aspects of ‘achievability’ cannot be divorced from consideration of ‘costs.’ Typically one
associates ‘costs’ with the capital requirements of new technology. However, certain ‘costs’
(e.g., frequent systemic shutdown to service emissions control systems or use of feedstock of
a certain size or composition in order to meet the new emissions standards) are more inti-
mately intertwined with ‘achievability’ than are the capital costs of new technology.
Nat’l Lime, 627 F.2d at 431 n.46 (citations omitted).
96. See Leslie Sue Ritts & Ben Snowden, The Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, in
THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 249, 269-73 (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli eds., 4th ed.
2016). Most add-on equipment today, given generations of testing and improvement in the
field, is demonstrably better in reliability, serviceability, and cost-of-operation.
97. Int’l Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 637-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
98. Judge Leventhal pled the panel’s “diffidence” over second-guessing EPA no fewer
than four times in his International Harvester opinion. Leventhal claimed to be as “diffident”
later that year rejecting EPA’s cement plant NSPS on the grounds that EPA had insuffi-
ciently investigated or analyzed prevailing conditions in reaching its achievability determina-
tion. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
99. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 135 (2008).
100. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1131 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (“Although EPA would ideally set MACT floors by surveying all existing
[sources] and identifying the best performing . . . with hard data, we have not required EPA
to go that far, recognizing that ‘EPA typically has wide latitude in determining the extent of
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question with their own inability to meet that standard rightly face strong
headwinds in court.)101 In the end, even those facing facility-specific tech-
nology-based constraints, like CAA § 165’s “best available control technol-
ogy” (BACT) reviews, must sometimes accept that their own factors of
production are the real obstacle.102
B. The Clean Water Act: The Meanings of ‘Available’
After Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,103 there is some reason to think
that the CWA’s many different calls for “best” technologies at least permit
the weighing of a technology’s costs.104 But that is a far cry from inferring,
given the Act’s many distinct references to technology’s availability for vari-
ous industrial applications (or the vague notion of cost), that a “best” tech-
nology mandate reduces to simple efficiency maximization.105 The Supreme
Court has made it too plain for too long that statutory factor balancing is
not lightly to be converted into anything else106 for us to infer so much
from Entergy.107
data-gathering necessary to solve a problem.’”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658,
662 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 923
(D.C. Cir. 1998), (using state regulatory data to determine what has been “achieved” in
practice).
101. See, e.g., Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); cf. BP Expl. & Oil, Inc.
v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 1995) (CWA “best available technology” determination).
102. Cf. Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653, 657-78 (7th Cir. 2007) (considering a chal-
lenge to an EPA BACT review that did not mandate burning low sulfur coal because EPA
thought it outside the scope of BACT and calling it a “borderline case” of agency arbitrari-
ness); Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 485-96 (2004) (affirming
EPA interpretation of BACT review under CAA § 165 as encompassing a “top-down” meth-
odology whereby the best performing techniques, equipment and process modifications are
arrayed against the costs to the emitter and only eliminated from consideration if they are
cost-prohibitive).
103. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
104. See id. at 225-26 (holding that the term “best” technology does not necessarily mean
the most efficient at producing some good no matter the cost); cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298, 325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (interpreting the several factors expressly named in CAA
§ 111(a)(1) as specifying the meaning of “best” technology).
105. Cf. Entergy, 556 U.S. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Unless costs are so high that
the best technology is not ‘available,’ Congress has decided that they are outweighed by the
benefits of minimizing adverse environmental impact.”).
106. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 418-21 (1971);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983);
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 644-47 (1990); Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-35 (2007); Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551
U.S. 644, 661-67 (2007).
107. Moreover, as the majority in Michigan v. EPA made clear in construing a CAA
provision that did not even mention the word “cost,” the Supreme Court’s notions of “cost”
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CWA standards demanding that pollution be abated at least as much as
the available technology accomplishes include CWA §§ 301 and 306’s “best
practicable control technology currently available” (BPT),108 “best conven-
tional pollutant control technology,” (BCT),109 “best available technology
economically achievable” (BATEA)110 (for existing sources) and “best availa-
ble demonstrated control technology” (BADT)111 (for new point source dis-
chargers).112 It includes CWA § 307(a)’s toxic pollutant standards,113 CWA
§ 316(b)’s “best technology available” standards for cooling water intakes,114
and CWA § 402(p)’s “maximum extent practicable” standard for municipal
and industrial stormwater discharge control.115
Early on, reviewing courts held that BPT for categories and classes of
existing sources meant “the average of the best existing performance by plants
of various sizes, ages, and unit processes within each industrial category.”116
And although the search for prevailing technology often extended outside
the United States,117 the cryptic boundaries of these sectors and the averag-
and weighing costs are far more elastic than orthodox benefit-cost analysis has allowed. See
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-08 (2015).
108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A).
109. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E). The so-called BCT “cost test” that arose in the wake
of the 1977 amendments grew out of EPA’s work to specify the cost of certain benchmark
technologies for the common pollutants of total suspended solids, biochemical oxygen de-
mand, and oil and grease. See Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology; Reasonable-
ness of Existing Effluent Limitation Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,732 (1979).
110. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
111. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).
112. Unlike the CAA, which consolidates review of such standard settings in one court
(the D.C. Circuit), the CWA’s special statutory review provision allows any court of appeals
to hear challenges to these technology-based standard settings. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
113. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1).
114. See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
115. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B); Tualatin Riverkeepers v. Or. Dept. of Envtl. Qual-
ity, 230 P.3d 559 (Or. App. 2010).
116. Am. Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 451 (7th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Sen. Edmund Muskie, in A Legislative History of Water Pollution Control Act Amends. of
1972, at 169-70 (1973)); see also Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 632
(2d Cir. 1976); cf. Am. Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(statutory factors for identifying “practicable” and “industrial category” including “the age of
the plants, their size, the unit processes involved, and the cost of applying such controls”
amount to a “limited cost-benefit analysis in order to maintain uniformity within a class and
category of point sources”).
117. See Am. Frozen Food, 539 F.2d at 132 (“Technology in the modern world knows few
boundaries—the United States-Canada boundary perhaps least of all.”). On the searches
EPA conducted, see WESLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 31-44 (1986). EPA was repeatedly challenged for finding (or
inventing) a “model plant” at this step. See A. Myrick Freeman III, Technology-Based Effluent
Standards: The U.S. Case, 16 WATER RESOURCES RES. 21, 24 (1980).
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ing to be done continually challenged the enterprise even as this dimension
rarely drew searching judicial scrutiny (either as a matter of arbitrariness or
as to statutory interpretation).118 Some of this is owed to the fact that Con-
gress itself scheduled the original industrial sectors to be governed by
BADT standards,119 but deference has remained the norm.120
The CWA’s factored determinations apply directly to effluent discharg-
ers in the absence of applicable sectoral standards.121 And whether individ-
ual facilities’ or whole categories of dischargers’ changes to their factors of
production or control equipment are at issue, the standard setting requires
calculating the costs of those expected changes and determining the man-
ageability thereof under given circumstances.122 At least one court devel-
oped its own distinctive theory of the CWA’s phased approach to this cost-
availability and the search for the performance benchmarks.123 The courts of
appeal divided, however, over whether BPT could require “internal altera-
118. From among “several thousand” effluent limitations pertaining to roughly forty in-
dustrial categories finalized by late 1977, La Pierre, supra note 56, at 808-09, the three dozen R
or so litigated to full judicial opinions concluded by then or in the years shortly following
included no instances where a court reversed EPA’s decision to subcategorize or its refusal to
do so.
119. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(citing CWA § 306(b)(1)(A) listing 27 source categories to be prioritized for new source
BADT standards).
120. See, e.g., Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 890-94 (6th Cir. 2006)
(reversing earlier panel opinion and affording broad deference to EPA to subcategorize the
coal mining sector according to age and condition of mines used).
121. The practice, known as “best professional judgment” (BPJ) permitting, tailors to
the facility, pollutants, and the available technology, balancing the applicable statutory fac-
tors for the effluent in question. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(a)(2)(B) (2016). EPA counsels per-
mit writers to use methods “consistent with the statistical approach EPA has used to develop
effluent guidelines,” including calculating maximum daily discharges “by multiplying the
long-term average achievable by implementation of the model technology or process change
by a daily variability factor determined from the statistical properties of a lognormal distri-
bution.” U.S. EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL § 5.2.3.5 (Sept. 2010).
122. Cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 843-46 (7th Cir. 1977) (testing the
cost-availability of facility’s installation of recycling operation and finding no cost-prohibitive
barriers thereto); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 656-58 (1st Cir. 1979). In
United States Steel, for example, EPA hired U.S. Steel’s own process engineer to compare its
plant to other, similar integrated steel mills and concluded that the reengineering proposed
was cost-available. See 556 F.2d at 842-46.
123. See Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1044-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding that
CWA § 304(b)(1)(B) required a focused balancing of “total cost” of expected improvements
against effluent reductions achieved and that § 304(b)(2)(B) BATEA later “relaxed” that
comparison to one of unweighted “consideration” of costs); cf. Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA,
615 F.2d 794, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting Weyerhaeuser’s interpretation of the CWA’s
phased approach).
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tions in production” as opposed to “end-of-pipe,” add-on solutions.124 But
with the CWA’s staged technology-based controls, the “average of the
best”125 for BPT was contrasted with BATEA standards (staged to arise six
years later) which were to require “ ‘a broader range of technological alter-
natives,’ including techniques ‘which exist in operation or which can be
applied as a result of public and private research efforts.’ ”126 BATEA solu-
tions were to be based on the “best performer in any industrial category,”127
keeping focal emphasis on the boundedness of an industrial category but
with less emphasis on cost-availability.128
It was gradually established in the cases that if inter-sectoral technology
transfers could, to a reasonable projection, work in the target sector, they
were “available” within the meaning of BATEA and BADT.129 To be sure,
several highly integrated industries’ trade groups opposed their standards at
every step,130 arguing that the adoption/diffusion of various technologies
124. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 981 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that “[i]n-
process control measures may be required . . . if they are considered normal practice within
the industry”); Tanners’ Council of Am., Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1976)
(“[BPT] effluent standards are to rely primarily on end-of-manufacturing treatment facilities
but may include control technologies within the process if these measures are considered
normal practice within the industry.”); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1033-34
(10th Cir. 1976) (recognizing disagreement among courts).
125. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1242 (10th Cir. 1979).
126. Am. Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 462 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting Legis. Hist.,
supra note 116, at 170); cf. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 226 (5th Cir. 1989) R
(“Congress intended these limitations to be based on the performance of the single best-
performing plant in an industrial field.”).
127. Am. Meat Inst., 526 F.2d at 463; see also Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d
1027, 1057 n.67 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting EPA was to be given the “capability and the mandate
to press technology and economics” to achieve the pollution reductions attainable); CPC
Int’l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1047 n.32 (8th Cir. 1975) (“available control technology” is
not confined only to technology that is “in actual, routine use somewhere”).
128. See, e.g., Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 929-31 (5th Cir. 1998)
(describing the subcategorization of the “coastal” oil/gas well sector and its transition from
BPT to BAT standards); cf. Am. Iron & Steel Inst., 526 F.2d at 1059 (cost to be given even
less weight in BADT for new sources than it is given for BATEA). On the BCT cost “test”
that arose after EPA had settled the list of “conventional” pollutants and the standard solu-
tions used for their removal. See supra note 109.
129. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 572-74 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing
Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 453 (4th Cir. 1986); Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v.
Train, 537 F.2d 620, 636 (2d Cir. 1976)). EPA’s finding that some such retrofit was cost-
available to the target facilities was also demanded by some courts. See, e.g., American Iron &
Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1977); Am. Iron & Steel Inst., 526 F.2d at
1047-48.
130. See, e.g., BP Expl. & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995) (detail-
ing the several standards and ensuing litigation in the oil and gas production well sector,
specifically regarding produced water discharges).
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throughout their sectors was cost-prohibitive.131 Whether the costs of re-
trofits and/or capital replacement are too high, i.e., not “available” or “achiev-
able,” has remained discretionary with EPA.132 But even BPT, even when
set individually,133 could impose substantial costs on sources not meeting a
performance norm observed in the industry.134 As the Fifth Circuit opined
years after BPT was supposed to have been phased out, it was never ex-
pected to be “cheap” just for being the most cost-conscious of the CWA’s
technology-based standards.135 Wherever a standard or “average” perform-
ance can be derived, the ensuing pressures exerted by that mark can be
substantial.136 And as, for example, the offshore oil/gas drilling sector
131. See, e.g., R.K. Clark, Impact of Environmental Regulations on Drilling-Fluid Technology,
46 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 804, 806-08 (1994) (describing the gradual substitution of water-based
drilling fluids for more toxic and environmentally persistent predecessors); cf. Tex. Oil & Gas
Ass’n, 161 F.3d at 930-33 (reviewing prolonged and litigious history of discharge standards
from oil/gas wells in coastal waters); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420,
1426-27 (9th Cir. 1988) (remanding EPA conclusion that it lacked needed evidence to re-
quire reinjection of produced water as “available technology” on the grounds that coastal
operations in California and Alaska had proven reinjection was “technologically feasible” and
the legislative history of CWA § 304 suggesting that “technologically feasible limitations”
should be set as BATEA even without “precise cost figures”).
132. See McCubbin, supra note 53, at 11-29. For example, in its famous cluster rule for R
pulp and paper manufacturers, dioxin-reducing shifts in production—to chlorine-free beach-
ing processes—were resisted by the industry and its unions, chiefly with projections that
such changes would close many more plants than a less stringent standard. See WILLIAM
BOYD, THE SLAIN WOOD: PAPERMAKING AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTH 189-216 (2015). The EPA’s adoption of the less stringent standard was upheld against
all challenges. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
133. Often, technology-based effluent limitations have been set either before a categori-
cal standard was finished or for sources lacking any applicable categorical effluent limitation
guidelines. See, e.g., Trs. for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1984). Less
often, EPA has issued “general permits” embodying such limits for dischargers in a given
region. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 787 F.2d 965, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1986).
134. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 843-46 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding
that BPT for integrated steel mill as use of a “recycling” system observed at other mills,
including some of permittee’s mills).
135. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 205 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Legis. His-
tory, supra note 116, at 523), (“Congress anticipated that initially BPT might cause many R
plant closures and the loss of 50,000 to 125,000 jobs.”); see David M. Driesen, Distributing the
Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2005) [hereinafter Driesen,
Distributing]. The original design assumed the standards would be routinely updated. See
ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 138-39 (1993).
136. See DRIESEN, supra note 7, at 85-91 (arguing that “radical qualitative innovation” can R
be sacrificed or crowded out by “least cost” pursuit of short term goals like marginal pollution
reductions).
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showed in the BATEA standards for “produced” water,137 pressures of the
kind applied across areas with natural cost disadvantages can be dispropor-
tionate if competitive disparities are not somehow corrected.138 Thus could
an ‘average of the best’ put someone out of business if they were not sol-
vent enough to make the needed changes or fortunate enough to have capi-
tal amenable to the retrofit.139
EPA’s new source standards (BADT), thought to be more stringent
than BPT and BATEA,140 are typically limited in applicability to “green-
field” sites.141 This tends to increase the number of “old” facilities gaining
competitive advantage from EPA’s actions.142 CWA § 316(b)’s unique focus
137. Produced water is “brought up from hydrocarbon-bearing strata with produced oil
and gas [and includes] brines trapped with the oil and gas in the formation and possibly
waters injected into the reservoir to increase productivity.” Michael O. Waguespack, Pro-
duced Waters in Coastal Louisiana, 3 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 7 (1990).
138. Cf. id. at 16-21 (reporting data from coastal Louisiana production tending to show
that produced water reinjection, though cost-available in Alaska and other coastal operations,
was cost-unavailable to Louisiana wells because of legacy and other costs borne there); see
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 263-66 (5th Cir. 1988).
139. See Trs. for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 554-60 (9th Cir. 1984) (challenge to EPA
general permits for placer mines lacking “technology-based” BPT or BATEA standards, not-
ing the plaintiffs’ allegation that settling ponds were BPT, and denying as moot miners’
challenge to such effluent limitations as a “taking” of their property in the form of their
mining claims); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 203-64 (5th Cir. 1989) (consider-
ing and dismissing cost-availability and subcategorization objections to BPT, BATEA,
BADT and pretreatment standards for chemicals sector); Citizens’ Coal Council v. EPA, 447
F.3d 879, 898-900 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding EPA’s qualitative analysis of old versus new
mine site utilization and stringency of standards intended to facilitate reuse of old mines);
Nat’l Renderers Ass’n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1290 (8th Cir. 1976) (speculating that EPA set
BADT standard’s stringency lower than BATEA based on its estimate that “no new plants
would be built”).
140. See WINSTON HARRINGTON, REGULATING INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION IN THE UNITED
STATES 5 (2003). In one instance, where the BADT standard seemed to permit “higher levels
of effluent” than the BATEA standard, a court remanded the new source standard for EPA’s
explanation. See Nat’l Renderers Ass’n, 541 F.2d at 1289-90.
141. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1) (2016) (limiting the applicability of BADT standards
at existing plants to complete reconstruction of existing units or the construction of wholly
new, “substantially independent” facilities). EPA has occasionally adjusted the criteria used
for determining ‘substantial independence’ in particular BADT standards. See, e.g., Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 568-69 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Citizens Coal Coun-
cil v. EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 898-900 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding EPA’s qualitative analysis of
old versus new mine site utilization and stringency of BADT standards intended to facilitate
reuse of old mines); Nat’l Renderers Ass’n, 541 F.2d at 1290 (speculating that EPA set BADT
standard’s stringency lower than BATEA based on its estimate that “no new plants would be
built”).
142. In theory, any differentiation between old and new facilities distorts the market for
capital replacement, endowing “old” capital “with a value that cannot be transferred,” hence
rendering new facilities “systematically more costly.” Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated
Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN. ENVTL.  L.J. 29, 42 (2006). The precise extent of this “old
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on the withdrawal of water as an input factor and four-facet evaluation
thereof (“location, design, construction and capacity”)143 are illustrative.144
For over a decade, EPA struggled to create a standard that did not dispro-
portionately burden identifiable industry segments, locations, or vintages of
capital—a struggle that prompted challenge after challenge.145 Of course,
new or old, a facility withdrawing less water will reduce its impacts propor-
tionately.146 Retrofitting existing facilities with new intake mechanisms
tends to be much cheaper than retrofitting them to recirculate their process
water or reuse gray water sources.147 EPA’s eventual allowance of capital-
specific solutions at existing facilities stemmed from cost-effectiveness stud-
ies, detailed knowledge of the relevant facility profiles and careful testing of
proven solutions.148 The water intakes rules highlight the key to cost-availa-
bility in the legal doctrine: it is rightly determined by the target polluters’
industrial organization and how the benchmark performances identified can
plant effect” is subject to considerable uncertainty, though. See infra notes 258-62 and accom-
panying text.
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
144. One important caveat about the intakes rules is in order. Though EPA prepared a
full cost-benefit analysis (pursuant to executive order and OMB’s insistence) in construing
the CWA § 316(b) mandate—the issue litigated in Entergy—the final outcome of that analy-
sis showed expected costs ($275-297 million) substantially outweighing benefits ($29-33 mil-
lion) in the final rule. National Pollution Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations
to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and
Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,304 (2014) [hereinafter
Revised Final Intakes Rule]. It therefore could not have been a decisive factor.
145. See Revised Final Intakes Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,312-18 (recounting history). In
an effort to create a single performance standard, EPA discovered that water intakes create
two problems: impingement mortality and entrainment mortality. The solutions for each
differ substantially, severely complicating a single performance standard that is cost-available
for existing sources nationwide. See Winston Harrington, The Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 160, 162-67 (Winston Harrington et al. eds.,
2009).
146. See Douglas A. Kysar, Fish Tales, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 190, 192
(Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009).
147. See Vincent C. Tidwell et al., Transitioning to Zero Freshwater Withdrawal in the US
for Thermoelectric Generation, 131 APPLIED ENERGY 508, 513-14 (2014). “In 2005 thermoelectric
power generation was the largest user of freshwater in the United States, withdrawing over
530 million cubic meters per day.” Id. at 509.
148. EPA eventually divided its water intakes rules between those applicable to new
units, see Final Rule—National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Ad-
dressing Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (2001)
[hereinafter Phase I Final Rule], those applicable to existing facilities withdrawing minimum
2 million gallons per day, and those for new offshore oil/gas production. See Revised Final
Intakes Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,303-7 (2014); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System—Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures
at Phase III Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (2006) [hereinafter Phase III Final Rule].
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be met in their circumstances.149 Part III isolates these two facets of every
technology-based standard and suggests why separate attention to each
often yields so much more than the sum of the parts.
III. COST AVAILABILITY? FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES
As skeptics of technology-based standards have long argued, industrial
sectors are not “natural kinds”150: finding their boundaries is inescapably a
matter of judgment. Industrial categories framed technology-based pollu-
tion standards in the U.S. even as the mass production economy waned and
sectors grew increasingly fuzzy.151 An economy’s productivity broken into
discrete sectors may be a macroeconomic sum, but it is given in increasingly
microeconomic terms.152 Yet instead of setting conduct constraints through
equilibrium theory’s algorithmic computation of prices and their resultant
“social” costs and benefits, judging pollution abatements to be within finan-
cial reach in targeted sectors views “cost” not as a proxy for harm but rather
as a motivational force.153 Indeed, given their relative successes compared to
other cost-factoring methods, cost-availability determinations may be the
better way to gauge real harms to an economy given the comparatively di-
rect connections between induced innovation, cost avoidance, and ulti-
mately economic adaptation.154 Diversified exchange economies may
measure their aggregate productivity by their sectors—where competitors
149. Elements of this finding have been suggested by others before. See La Pierre, supra
note 56, at 809-29; Note, Technology-Based, supra note 3, at 795-800; William F. Pedersen, Jr., R
Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 82-85 (1988); Wendy E. Wagner, The
Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 88-91; DRIESEN, supra note 7, R
at 110-22.
150. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
657, 689 (2010).
151. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILI-
TIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984).
152. See generally ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH (2016). The
so-called “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) used to forecast climate change damages all
reduce welfare-equivalent consumption by sector-based multipliers. See Weitzman, supra note
24, at 16. This keeps the “social cost of carbon” (SCC) calculated from IAMs innately sensi- R
tized to sector-based growth projections.
153. Cf. Cooter, supra note 12 (developing and describing a bargaining model where R
opposing effective costs are used to encourage parties to bilateral transactions to deal effec-
tively with one another); Malloy, supra note 20, at 551-86 (presenting a “scenario” analysis of R
innovation incentives in a multi-divisional chemical engineering firm and showing that
“black box” theories of innovation firms ignore the paths costs and information actually
travel).
154. Cf. Malloy, supra note 20, at 600 (finding that “tailored regulation” identifying R
firm-specific barriers to innovation can be much more accurate in the incentives it sets for
cost minimization).
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compete, production and consumption functions meet, and labor, capital,
energy, and other factors combine to shape the goods and services deliver-
ing that economy’s standard of living.155 But finding sectoral boundaries is
no easy task. Section A draws out some connections between industrial or-
ganization and innovation while Section B highlights the problematic con-
cept of “cost” in contemporary theories.
A. Industrial Organization: Innovation Pushed and Pulled
Although the induced innovation hypothesis has been notoriously hard
to test econometrically,156 a positive, monotonic relationship between firm
size and spending on research and development (R&D) has for many years
been one of the more robust findings.157 Spending does not neatly correlate
with output or outcomes, of course, something economists studying innova-
tion have long known.158 And if the economic landscape includes mul-
tiproduct (multi-sector) firms, like A and B in our earlier hypothetical, the
fungibility of capital within such firms severs any causal relationship be-
tween market power and innovation.159 Indeed, compared to “our under-
standing of the influence of industry-level variables, our understanding of
the role of firm-level variables is more primitive still.”160 Still, if every tech-
nology-based standard has involved EPA in identifying the industrial organ-
155. Compare SAMUELSON, supra note 34, at ch. 6 (observing that firms are needed to R
manage production efficiently and that they often take on similar structures and scales in
industrial sectors), with RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 235-45 (1982) (presenting an informal model of economic growth as a
selection process in which the more advanced, more capable firms employing better technol-
ogy and techniques put less adapted firms out of business).
156. See Popp et al., supra note 29, at 880-81; Cohen, supra note 9, at 142. R
157. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 193. “There is also reason to believe that the source of R
this relationship is the R&D cost-spreading incentive effects of firm size . . . The relation-
ship between market structure and R&D remains, however, problematic.” Id. at 193-94.
Larger firms’ cost-spreading and returns to scale have even featured in fairness arguments
against technology-based standard setting. See, e.g., Amy Purvis & Joe Outlaw, What We
Know About Technological Innovation to Achieve Environmental Compliance: Policy Issues for an
Industrializing Animal Agriculture Sector, 77 AM . J. AGRIC. ECON. 1237, 1242 (1995).
158. See Cohen & Levin, supra note 9, at 1069. R
159. See David J. Teece, Technological Innovation and the Theory of the Firm: The Role of
Enterprise-Level Knowledge, Complementarities, and (Dynamic) Capabilities, in 1 HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 680, 688 (Nathan Rosenberg & Bronwyn Hall eds., 2005). It
does not necessarily sever the ties between the timing of pollution abatement investments
and other productive investments within the firm, of course. See, e.g., Wayne B. Gray &
Ronald J. Shadbegian, Environmental Regulation, Investment Timing, and Technology Choice, 46
J. INDUST. ECON. 235, 237 (1998) (reporting finding “significant relationships” between
amount and timing of pollution abatement investment and productive (non-abatement) in-
vestment, at least at the plant level).
160. Cohen, supra note 9, at 195. R
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ization underlying its targeted pollution and the benchmark solution(s) by
which abatements will be mandated, then EPA should at least be looking for
relationships that actually matter. This section identifies some
preliminaries.
A technological frontier signifies what we can/cannot do whereas industry
sectoral boundaries are defined by organizational and market dynamics. The
former is often a work-in-progress,161 but the latter can be pure happen-
stance. Both are impermanent (if also inertial) yet nevertheless ground the
technology-based approach. They frame the opportunities for competitive
and other pressures to induce welfare-enhancing innovation, i.e., cost-avoid-
ance.162 Being so impermanent, however, their analysts are oriented to sen-
sitivities that most cost-benefit analyses obscure or ignore.163 This may
explain the latter’s clear tendency to over-estimate regulation’s costs,164 but
it also suggests that technology-based cost-availability evaluations may be
substantially more useful for what they do and do not represent.165
161. See ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 104-19 (describing the “superficially paradoxical” R
tendency toward slowed technological diffusion during periods of rapid technological ad-
vance). Coal-fired boilers, for example, steadily improved in efficiencies from 1900 when it
took almost 7 pounds of coal to generate a kilowatt hour of electricity to less than a pound to
generate it in the 1960s. Id. at 65. Indeed, total efficiency improvements in coal mining,
transport, combustion, electricity conversion and transmission from 1907-1957 were tenfold.
Id. at 66. Predictive modeling of continued further progress here comes down to the proper
accounting for opportunity costs of innovation production, treatment of knowledge spillovers
and appropriability, and the empirical data (if any) available for parameterizing the key
relationships. See Kenneth Gillingham et al., Modeling Endogenous Technological Change for
Climate Policy Analysis, 30 ENERGY ECON. 2734 (2008). But from those factors there is good
reason to doubt coal’s run will continue. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
162. As Cohen found in his exhaustive literature review, the variables having at least
some empirical support at the sectoral level include demand, appropriability, and the techno-
logical “opportunity conditions,” i.e., the sector’s baseline opportunities for technical ad-
vance. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 168-93. R
163. See Finkel, supra note 33, at 125-54 (cataloguing various paths cost-benefit analysis R
takes to ignoring or mishandling cost uncertainties); Farber, supra note 51, at 99-108 (finding R
the timing of cost considerations when opposed to benefits uneven at EPA); cf. Livermore,
supra note 31, at 627 (noting that the largest percentage of EPA economists is in the Office R
of the Administrator where their influence is concentrated, like a “mini-OMB” within EPA,
at the end of rulemaking processes).
164. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
165. Judging as acceptable any projected costs and where they will fall need not entail
weighing them in opposition to benefit estimations. Indeed, as Knight argued in response to
Pigou’s Economics of Welfare (decades before Coase), “[i]t is only when one commodity is
given up in order that another may be produced by the use of the common and divertible
productive energy that we ordinarily think of the variation of cost.” Knight, supra note 28 at
594 (emphasis added). Thus, to convert projected firm costs into “social” costs before they are
even realized is to obscure the more “universal meaning” of cost as “the sacrifice of a value
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So how ought the analyst to align the relevant comparisons? If technol-
ogy-based standard setting hinges on knowing which firms or firm types are
best suited to innovate, it is surely a muddle. But if it starts from definite
descriptions of production,166 the discrete factors of that production,167 and
verified performance leaders168 instead of a synthetic calculus derived more
from algorithms than investigation, then the analyst cannot help but con-
front a fuller variety of costs in actual markets: the relevant tax distortions
and/or vintage classes of capital, real trade-exposure or pressures to off-
shore, the market power, illiquidity, and/or insolvency of incumbents, inno-
vations known to be on the horizon if not yet commercialized, learning-by-
doing or other complementarities peculiar to the sector, and the kinds of
processes, equipment, and professionals common therein. That analyst can-
not help but confront the firm not as equilibrium theory’s static-state
placeholder—or even its dynamic cypher—but rather as a live experiment in
practical problem-solving.169 In that analyst’s world, innovations flow from
the pull of demand, the push of supply, and much in between.170 In short,
alternative.” Id. at 593. The use of cost in cost-availability stringency evaluations avoids at
least that logical mistake.
166. The basic insight that individual firms’ costs of compliance can vary widely is com-
monplace. See, e.g., ALBERT L. NICHOLS, TARGETING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 31 (1984). But it can motivate much more than a faith in Pigovian taxes or trade-
able allowances. In the technology-based approach, it motivates EPA to become intimately
familiar with particular firms and their operations. See, e.g., National Emissions Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions: Hard and Decorative Chromium Electroplating and
Chromium Anodizing Tanks; and Steel Pickling-HCI Process Facilities and Hydrochloric
Acid Regeneration Plants, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,220, 58,222-223 (2012) [hereinafter Final Chro-
mium Rule] (having found 188 large plants, 394 small plants, about 70 of which were in
California, and the exact tools used to achieve observed performances in each).
167. Labor, capital, energy and other basic inputs may be decomposable—which often
motivates the argument that taxes are preferable to rules as instruments of social cost mini-
mization. That flexibility is curbed substantially, however, when a single sector at a discrete
point in time becomes the focus. See infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
168. As we have noted throughout, performance standards capture abatements made by
add-on equipment, process, and input changes alike. See supra note 21 accompanying text. R
169. Cf. Jacques H. Dreze, (Uncertainty and) The Firm in General Equilibrium Theory, 95
ECON. J. 1, 1 (1985) (“The firm fits into general equilibrium theory as a balloon fits into an
envelope: flattened out! Try with a blown-up balloon: the envelope may tear, or fly away: at
best, it will be hard to seal and impossible to mail . . . Instead, burst the balloon flat, and
everything becomes easy.”); Teece, supra note 159, at 686-89 (noting that many firms out- R
source their innovation and that the “innovation ecosystem” in which the firm exists exerts
multiple, often conflicting influences on its choices).
170. As Bauman and colleagues showed with a formal model, it is only by assuming
pollution abatements always take the form of end-of-pipe add-ons—rather than process or
input changes—that the conventional wisdom can still hold pollution taxes and/or allowances
(our Rule 2 and Rule 3) induce more innovation than performance standards (like Rule 1). See
Bauman et al., supra note 42, at 511-17. If analysts make the conventional assumptions about R
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the analyst should look for relevant differences and similarities not through
the dogma of technical change and equilibrium but rather by bottom-up
descriptions of observable facts and realistic possibilities.171
A focus like this has embedded EPA in a world where trade is not
costless and so not necessarily efficient,172 where ‘path-dependence,’ in-
creasing returns, and network effects are often pronounced,173 where indi-
vidual firms’ capabilities and so-called sunk costs can be anchors,174 where
short-run profits not only exist but define economic life,175 and where the
abatement costs, e.g., innovation always lowers marginal abatement costs, they will expect—
perhaps incorrectly—that performance standards will generally be both under- and over-
controlling.
171. About all that can be said after decades of search on this front is that empirical tests
and rigorous modeling have mostly rejected the orthodox claim, see, e.g., Jacob Schmookler,
Economic Sources of Inventive Activity, 22 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1962), that demand alone pulls
innovation. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., The Environment and Directed Technical Change,
102 AM . ECON. REV. 131 (2012) (presenting a growth model where supply of the final good,
produced from substitutable clean or dirty inputs, can, barring exhaustion of the inputs, tend
toward environmental disaster without timely and appropriate policy intervention); Daron
Acemoglu, Directed Technical Change, 69 REV. ECON. STUDS. 781 (2002) [hereinafter
Acemoglu, Directed] (noting orthodox model wherein technical innovation follows from mar-
ket signals and presenting an alternative model of technical change, its direction and pace
demonstrating that “equilibrium bias” can systematically advantage certain factors of produc-
tion once they get a head start on the competition). This ‘necessity paradox’ may even be
reason enough to reject equilibrium theory itself. See Nicholas Kaldor, The Irrelevance of
Equilibrium Economics, 82 ECON. J. 1237, 1245 (1972). What macroeconomic modelers face
instead amounts to methodological turmoil. See Andreas Löschel, Technological Change in
Economic Models of Environmental Policy: A Survey, 43 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 105, 116 (2002).
172. Cf. KLEIN, supra note 35, at 20-24 (arguing that only static analyses can presume R
perfect information leading to rational assessments of trade possibilities); NELSON, supra note
155; cf. YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 11-14 (2d ed. 1997) (noting a R
methodological divide between general equilibrium theory and the newer institutional theo-
ries where information costs and other frictions predominate).
173. See Elhanan Helpman & Manuel Trajtenberg, Diffusion of General Purpose Technolo-
gies, in GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 85 (Elhanan Helpman ed.,
1998); W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 24-35
(1994); THŔAINN EGGERTSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 3-32 (1990).
174. See David J. Teece et al., Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 509 (1997); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract
Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988); NELSON, supra note 155, at 96-136; R
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975);
Herbert A. Simon, A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship, 19 ECONOMETRICA 293,
302-05 (1951) (presenting a model wherein uncertainty brings more decisions within firm
boundaries than it pushes beyond them).
175. See Geoffrey T.F. Brooke, Uncertainty, Profit and Entrepreneurial Action: Frank
Knight’s Contribution Reconsidered, 32 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 221, 228-34 (2010) (arguing that
Knight’s theory of entrepreneurial profit grounded in subjective expectations is a major cri-
tique of equilibrium theory); see infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
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availability and cost of capital diverge substantially from the ideal.176 Un-
derstanding cost-availability in that context means elevating inertial rela-
tionships over neoclassical dogmas. Doing so on a rolling basis is implicit in
both facets of the task given the impermanence in those relations. Finally, it
entails some measure of skepticism: to whatever extent EPA’s finding and
sharing of practical solutions converts them into something of a ‘public
good,’ incumbent firms may be biased against investing in the search for
ways to meet or exceed expectations.177
For example, EPA set its CWA effluent standards by weighing the (1)
inputs used, (2) outputs produced, (3) process(es) employed, (4) age and
size of capital equipment/facilities, and (5) the pollutant/waste constituents
generated.178 Its effluent standards requiring the “best available” technology
EPA could deem “economically achievable” often involved identifying a
“model plant,”179 but it occasionally identified abatement solutions wholly
foreign to the target sector where they were demonstrably transferable.180
Transfers like this entail specific and detailed investigations. Mining opera-
tions’ effluents put EPA to predicting likely future metal prices—showing
the sector’s expected solvency and liquidity and, thus, capacity to retrofit.181
The investigation can even involve estimating the sector’s likely manage-
ment of legacy costs,182 a particularly problematic projection given the pos-
sibility of bankruptcy protections.183 More common is the in-depth
assessment of substituting one (cleaner) factor for another.184
176. See, e.g., Ken S. Cavalluzzo & Linda C. Cavalluzzo, Market Structure and Discrimi-
nation: The Case of Small Businesses, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 771 (1998); GARY S.
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
177. Within-industry spillovers “reduce the incentive to engage in R&D, because a firm
must share with its competitors the benefits of its investment.” Cohen, supra note 9, at 181; R
see also Cohen & Levin, supra note 9, at 1089. On the other hand, controversy rages still R
today over identifying the properly “public” goods which the market systematically under-
produces.
178. See La Pierre, supra note 56, at 810-11 (describing how EPA categorized industrial R
sectors for the CWA’s BPT and BATEA standards); MAGAT ET AL., supra note 117, at 33. R
179. See Freeman, supra note 117, at 24. R
180. See, e.g., Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 450-55 (4th Cir. 1985).
181. See, e.g., id. at 456-57; Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1291 (9th Cir. 1990).
182. See, e.g., Citizens’ Coal Council v. EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 893-98 (6th Cir. 2006);
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 562-66 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
183. See infra notes 268-60 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Final Rule—National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
for Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards,
and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed.
Reg. 18,504 (1998) [hereinafter Final Cluster Rule]. The cluster rule for pulp and paper
manufacturing put EPA to evaluating the elimination of elemental chlorine-based bleaching
(and its substitutes)—which was the source of much of the worst pollution. Some firms’
actual compliance strategies may have included switching off of bleached products. See Aaron
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Perhaps most importantly, finding reach solutions of the kind which are
achievable (or “available”) while delaying their effective dates, allowing
firms to devise their own least-cost approximations thereof, can synch regu-
latory and profit-making priorities, maximizing cost-avoidance opportuni-
ties.185 One BATEA standard (for pulp and paper making) which also
simultaneously set MACT standards for a suite of related HAPs provoked
multiple reactions from the incumbent firms which could never have been
predicted ex ante.186 The capital equipment of pulp and papermaking, noto-
riously long-lived and adaptable,187 drew these firms to shift product
mixes188 and sell off or shutter marginal plants,189 yet also, in many cases, to
adopt the benchmark solutions root and branch.190 This was cost-as-motiva-
tional-force at work: with the set performance standard as the permit con-
straint, pollutant reductions went almost exactly as expected191—even as
some firms’ “costs” became others’ profits in the ensuing shake-up.192
A. Elrod & Arun S. Malik, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Plant-Level Product Mix:
A Study of EPA’s Cluster Rule, 84 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. (forthcoming 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2342179.
185. To be sure, cost-benefit analysts prioritize delay in effective dates as a means of
minimizing their “costs” for exactly this reason. See, e.g., CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 60, at § C R
(“[A] regulation that provides sufficient lead time is likely to achieve its goals at a much
lower overall cost than a regulation that is effectively immediately.”). One of the chief tools
Porter and van der Linde highlight in their account of firms’ capacities to offset regulatory
costs is synchronizing performance standards with a target’s expected capital turnovers to
maximize the incentive effects any given action can exert. See Porter & van der Linde, supra
note 42, at 113. That will require more attention than just some arbitrary delay interval. For R
example, independent pressures to cut pollution might begin this process ahead of technol-
ogy-based standard setting, thereby further improving cost-avoidance opportunities. See
WAYNE B. GRAY & RONALD J. SHADBEGIAN, MULTIMEDIA POLLUTION REGULATION AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PERFORMANCE 3-18 (2015) [hereinafter GRAY & SHADBEGIAN, MULTIMEDIA].
186. Cynthia Morgan et al., Ex Ante and Ex Post Cost Estimates of the Cluster Rule and
MACT II Rule, 5 J. BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 195, 219 (2014) (finding through SEC disclosures
that some firms accurately predicted their realized compliance costs, some substantially over-
estimated those costs, and none substantially under-estimated them).
187. See BOYD, supra note 132, at 116-23 R
188. See Elrod & Malik, supra note 184, at 20. R
189. See Morgan et al., supra note 186, at 216-18. The industry was already in the midst
of a major consolidation throughout the cluster rule’s proposal and finalization. See U.S.
EPA, EPA 310-R-95-015, PROFILE OF THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY 13-14 (1995). EPA took
what was thought to be the unprecedented step of offering credits of a kind to firms that had
already reduced their dioxin discharges with various capital updates. See William Boyd, Con-
trolling Toxic Harms: The Struggle Over Dioxin Contamination in the Pulp and Paper Industry, 21
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 345, 392 (2002).
190. See Final Cluster Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,517.
191. See, e.g., GRAY & SHADBEGIAN, MULTIMEDIA, supra note 185, at 17. R
192. EPA was well aware that delaying implementation too long, e.g., five years, would
simply defer the inevitable consolidation. See Final Cluster Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,550
(noting that a five-year delay would introduce greater uncertainties given the boom-bust
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Finally, if outputs remain roughly constant while inputs, equipment,
and/or processes shift (as happened, for example, in steel manufacturing
with the advent of mini-mills and the electric arc furnace),193 benchmarking
performances can present a unique challenge.194 Sub-categorization is al-
ways an option, but EPA can easily find itself an unwitting participant in a
market struggle, politicizing its work and undermining its own authority.195
A version of this trap (among others) seems to have ensnared EPA’s “Clean
Power Plan” (CPP)—a complex effort to spur states to reduce the “carbon
intensity” of their wholesale electricity markets by way of their own pre-
ferred, cost-minimizing means.196 As Part IV shows, however,197 technol-
ogy-based standard-setting must often, as the CPP did, align sectors on the
basis of output notwithstanding diverging modes of production. EPA faces a
choice in such cases over where to aim its signals: at the production factors,
the control techniques, or some one-off synthesis of the two. EPA has often
identified robust, adaptable solutions like selective catalytic reduction,198
electrostatic precipitation199 or, in the water context, settle/filtration tank-
ing and lagooning,200 the incremental improvement of which can be facili-
tated by induced diffusion.201 Even these solutions can be tailored to input,
cycle in pulp and paper markets without necessarily reducing any resulting costs of compli-
ance). It was also aware that some plants, given their idiosyncrasies of location, were not
amenable to retrofitting no matter the delay allowed. See Gray & Shadbegian, supra note 159, R
at 238.
193. See Matthias Ruth, Technology Change in the US Iron and Steel Production, 21 RE-
SOURCES POL’Y 199, 205-07 (1995).
194. Several of the inputs and wastes generated by an integrated steel mill, e.g., metal-
lurgical coke, ore, and associated wastes, are no part of mini-mills. Hence EPA’s most recent
BATEA for steel mills targeting effluent generated from coking drew challenge only from
the coke/coal trade group. See American Coke & Coal Chems. Inst. v. EPA, 452 F.3d 930,
932 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Mini-mills have taken market share from integrated mills for over
three decades—and promised to do so from the start. See U.S. EPA, EPA 310-R-95-005,
PROFILE OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 13 (1995); cf. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 151, at 208-11 R
(calling mini-mills a kind of “flexible specialization”). And although mini-mills still do not
produce all of the goods integrated mills can, they are much less capital-intensive to open, to
operate, and to idle awaiting demand. PROFILE OF IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, supra note 194, at
13-26.
195. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 249-71 and accompanying text. R
197. See infra notes 261-70 and accompanying text. R
198. See AIR POLLUTION COST MANUAL, supra note 89, at § 4.2. R
199. See id. at § 6.
200. See U.S. EPA, EPA/600/R-11/088, PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN AND OPERATIONS OF WASTE-
WATER TREATMENT POND SYSTEMS FOR PLANTS OPERATORS, ENGINEERS, AND MANAGERS § 8.1-8.5
(2011).
201. If diffusion is weak, the key to its acceleration may be the very improvements that
would stem from widespread adoption. See Popp et al., supra note 29, at 899-910. EPA R
originally believed this was the case with flue gas desulfurization (FGD) scrubbers for boil-
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factor, process, geographic, or other kinds of variability, however.202 Hold-
ing all targets in a sample to the same standard can entail costs that cost-
benefit hawks typically think are excess costs.203 But it is an empirical ques-
tion whether such costs outweigh the (excess) costs of taxes, allowances (our
Rules 2 and 3), or anything else.204 Moreover, without at least some of these
“costs” burdening production, no social signal is sent calling up responsive,
innovative adaptations.205 And without knowing all the possible adaptations,
the analyst is simply prejudging which response(s) is the one worth induc-
ing.206 Thus, given the uncertainty of the cost-minimization possibilities,
sectoral boundaries and technological frontier estimates ordinarily should
ers, industrial furnaces, and steam electric power generating units. See Note, Forcing Technol-
ogy, supra note 56, at 1722-24. Its efforts to that end were quickly submerged in a bitter R
political brawl over the economic winners and losers of that induced diffusion. See ACKERMAN
& HASSLER, supra note 81. Eventually, the CAA and EPA’s vintage-differentiation between R
“new” (FGD-required) and existing (not required) plants grew into a major disincentive to
retire old equipment in favor of newer, more efficient—but also more stringently regulated—
units. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE “WAR
ON COAL” (2016).
202. Compare Small Refiner Lead Phase-down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 525-37
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (reviewing EPA’s treatment of “small” refineries, their access to capital to
acquire the needed equipment, and the reasonableness of the predictive model EPA em-
ployed), with Revised Final Intakes Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,339 (rejecting closed cycle
cooling as nationwide “best technology available” for existing water withdrawals on grounds
that land availability, expected energy penalties and consequent air emissions, and remaining
useful plant life varied so substantially facility-by-facility). In one of the few truly longitudi-
nal studies of energy efficiency improvements induced by energy prices, Newell and col-
leagues found a correlation, albeit one severely complicated by other factors and various
indivisibilities, between the price of energy services and the energy efficiency of goods of-
fered for sale. See Richard G. Newell et al., The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-
Saving Technological Change, 114 Q.J. ECON. 941, 970-71 (1999).
203. See, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 150, at 682-83. R
204. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. R
205. Cf. Porter & van der Linde, supra note 42, at 99 (“[R]egulation signals companies R
about likely resource inefficiencies and potential technological improvements.”); Acemoglu,
Directed, supra note 171, at 783 (finding that irrespective of the elasticity of substitution R
between factors, an increase in the relative abundance of a factor creates some measure of
technical change biased toward that factor); BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 42, at 61-63 (when R
costs of internalizing an externality are uncertain, the choice between Pigovian taxes and
tradeable allowances is indeterminate). Of course, the precision of that signal hinges on
several factors, chief among which are the format, applicability, and stringency of the stan-
dard set. See infra notes 292-293 and accompanying text. R
206. Guesses like this are to be avoided on virtually any account of cost factoring. Com-
pare CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 60, at 17, 27 (all cost estimates should be explicable, transpar- R
ent, monetized where possible, and qualitatively rationalized if not), with DRIESEN, supra note
7, at 93-105 (arguing that markets are an example of good but not great adaptive efficiency R
for their sustaining diverse and constant experimentation pursuing innovation while opaque
government decision-making are the opposite).
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seek the best targets for any ensuing cost/signals.207 This is doubly impor-
tant if we understand costs as the enemy of profits: to whatever extent a
firm is experiencing costs it cannot avoid, that is one kind of profit opportu-
nity or another. Section B shows how judgments of this kind are invariably
aided by the “engineering” investigations technology-based standard setting
entails208—investigations that cost-benefit accounting too often foregoes.
B. Theory Versus (Realized) Costs
Resources for the Future and others have shown that ex ante evaluations
continue to over-estimate the costs of complying with EPA standards com-
pared to ex post ‘ground-truthing’ where it is done.209 The unpredictability
of cost avoidance is an evident source of error.210 Even after-the-fact costs
can be deeply uncertain.211 Firms strive to avoid costs, but quantifying their
(expected) successes or failures has turned out to be an intractable prob-
lem.212 For example, some firms have been known to adopt solutions set out
207. See infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
208. Pizer & Kopp, supra note 39, at 1312. R
209. See RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN, THE RFF REGULATORY PERFORMANCE INITIATIVE: WHAT
HAVE WE LEARNED? (RFF DP 15-47) 30-35 (Oct. 2015) (reporting the results of nine retro-
spective studies by RFF researchers); Morgan, supra note 186, at 195; JOSEPH E. ALDY, LEARN-
ING FROM EXPERIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF AGENCY RULES AND THE
EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATORY POLICY (2014).
210. See, e.g., MORGENSTERN, supra note 209, at 13. In Pigovian terms, the divergence R
between private and social costs—the “externality”—by itself explains neither the existence,
scope, nor behavior of actual firms. See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 141, 150-56 (1979). Some even argue that firms’ interaction with their own factors of
production yields innovation that, in its rate, direction, and value is irremediably stochastic.
See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 123. But if vertical integration—like production itself— R
is aimed at profit-making, it necessarily implies cost avoidance regardless of the sense in
which costs are finally valued. Business strategists press this point instinctually. See, e.g.,
PORTER, supra note 36, at 64 (“The behavior of a firm’s costs and its relative cost position stem R
from the value activities the firm performs in competing in an industry. A meaningful cost
analysis, therefore, examines costs within these activities and not the costs of the firm as a
whole.”).
211. For example, most of the efficiency gains made from the tradeable SO2 allowances
created by the 1990 CAA amendments apparently stemmed from the spatial disparities be-
tween plants near low sulfur coal and those far from it. See Curtis Carlson et al., Sulfur
Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1292,
1320 (2000) (finding that spatial disparity explains most of the allowance trading that actu-
ally occurred). The relative magnitude of those gains compared to gains achieved under the
1970s NSPSs, however, has been questioned. See Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation as the
Mother of Innovation: The Case of SO2 Control, 27 L. & POL’Y 348 (2005) (arguing that most of
the innovation in controlling SO2 emissions came before 1990).
212. See Pizer & Kopp, supra note 39, at 1342 (“Without a randomized experiment to R
understand the consequences of new regulation, it is impossible to speak confidently about
the costs borne by firms.”).
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in technology-based proposals—aiming to gain the early mover advantage—
only to shift the technology baseline when EPA is finalizing the stan-
dard.213 Of course, this source of error plagues cost-availability judgments
no more than it does cost-benefit balancing.214 The difference is that cost-
availability evaluation may do better still.
Modern theories of the firm are more aptly described as theories of the
boundaries of the firm—what firms optimize that markets do not.215 To view
the median firm as existing just as it does in order to minimize both its
exchange and production costs216 is to view industrial organization as a per-
manent disequilibrium.217 It raises the notorious distinction between “mar-
ginal” and “average” costs218—a quagmire in economic theory going back
generations.219 But it does not much aid our sense of what will probably
result from set production constraint(s) like our technology-based stan-
dards.220 Knowing that firms typically “learn by doing” and thereby turn
production into its own means of cost avoidance does not quantify that
213. See Final Cluster Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,517-518.
214. Cf. id. at 18,550 (noting EPA uncertainty in expected cost estimates, no matter how
used). The difference, of course, is that benefits uncertainty will also detract from the stan-
dard’s confidence level.
215. See Robert Gibbons, Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?, 58 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 200, 201-04 (2005) (tracing four distinct groups of theories explaining firm scale and
scope and the incentives to integrate). Of course, if the long-run cost curves of the firms in a
sector are horizontal, “the size of each firm is indeterminate.” BLAUG, supra note 12, at 436. R
But if the size of each firm is indeterminate, so is the number of firms in each industry—
thereby casting doubt on the large numbers property of “perfect competition.” Id.
216. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM . ECON. REV. 777 (1972); cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (firm size depends on the costs of organizing different entre-
preneurs versus the exchange costs of using prices to do so).
217. Cf. Richard N. Langlois, Transaction-cost Economics in Real Time, 1 INDUST. & CORP.
CHANGE 99, 105 (1992) (arguing that the “reigning” theories of the firm provide “illuminating
snapshots of possible institutional responses to a momentary situation,” but do not contextu-
alize those responses in the passage of time).
218. “Instead of being differentiating in [the sense Adam Smith articulated] . . . an inno-
vation may be integrating, in the sense that the new way of doing things—a new machine,
say—performs in one step what had previously needed two or more steps.” Id. at 117 (empha-
sis in original).
219. See BLAUG, supra note 12, at 586-95. R
220. A variety of theories has long critiqued the neoclassical view of firms that they are
merely profit-maximizing modes of production. See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on
the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1757-65 (1989).
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effect.221 Nor does it provide usable boundaries within which the effect
should be expected.222
Still, this sort of microeconomics diverges dramatically from the ortho-
doxy that prices reliably balance supply and demand,223 that unprofitable
competitors fail,224 and that technological progress is (relatively) con-
stant.225 In the orthodox variants of cost-benefit analysis, setting a perform-
ance standard involves methodological circularities of one severity or
another.226 If it is of the “general” equilibrium variety, the circularity comes
from using prices to calculate utility functions in an exercise grounded in
the conviction that markets do not accurately price utility.227 If it is some
221. But see ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 120-40 (arguing that many classes of capital R
equipment could be studied for their predictable ‘learning by using’ returns). Arrow is cele-
brated for being first to formalize shifting production functions from the very activity of
production. See, e.g., ROBERT M. SOLOW, LEARNING FROM “LEARNING BY DOING”: LESSONS FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1997) (explaining the influence of Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Impli-
cations of Learning by Doing, 29 REV. ECON. STUDS. 155 (1962)) [hereinafter SOLOW, LEARNING].
But Arrow’s results proved too much, so to speak, and implied that ‘bounded learning by
doing’ is the only realistic possibility. See id. at 10-21.
222. See SOLOW, LEARNING, supra note 221, at 34-41 (explaining Arrow’s model as a provo- R
cation, not a description of growth).
223. See Kaldor, supra note 171, at 1242-44. But see Coase, supra note 27, at 713-14 (call- R
ing both the traditional focus on price and the industrial organization tradition “blackboard
economics” for their low evidence-to-theory ratios); cf. BARZEL, supra note 172, at 11 (“In the
[traditional] model, when equilibrium is disturbed a new equilibrium is instantaneously at-
tained because, given zero transaction costs, the cost of adjustment is zero . . . commodities
are made up of strictly identical specimens, people are fully informed regarding the ex-
changed commodities, the terms of trade are always perfectly clear, and trade is
instantaneous.”).
224. Cf. DRIESEN, supra note 7, at 93-94 (analyzing Amazon.com’s long-term unprofit- R
ability and uninhibited capacity to raise capital). Regulation can, of course, create such dis-
tortions. Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1677 (2007)
(describing vintage-differentiated regulatory standards’ practical effect in US firms’ invest-
ment and operating decisions); Stavins, supra note 142, at 42. R
225. Cf. Elhanan Helpman & Manuel Trajtenberg, A Time to Sow and a Time to Reap:
Growth Based on General Purpose Technologies, in GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 55 (Elhanan Helpman ed., 1998) (finding that “general purpose technologies” which
become extremely pervasive and sustain continued improvements in performance do so by
fostering complementarities within their user sectors and account for a disproportionate
share of total economic growth over time).
226. It will also entail the risk of two dimensions of uncertainty: that of risk/benefit
estimates and that of cost estimates. See Finkel, supra note 33, at 110. R
227. See MISHAN & QUAH, supra note 34, at 87-93; cf. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. R
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 161 (2006) (wrestling with the incom-
pleteness of “overall welfare” given the limited range of goods encompassed); LITTLE, supra
note 28, at 8-22 (struggling to find Pigou’s or Marshall’s theory of value and welfare consis- R
tent with their ‘law of diminishing marginal utility’ and concluding that their “positive eco-
nomics” has no coherent concept of utility).
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“partial” equilibrium exercise, it comes from assuming that a sector’s givens,
including its pollution abatement opportunities, are independent of the
broader economy.228 Assessing a technical solution’s costs, and thus its cost-
availability, for a sector’s actual incumbent firms (or even a single, unique
establishment) sheds those circularities for the value judgment that the true
social harms to be avoided in regulation stem from production’s observed
indivisibilities like job losses, stranded capital, unique firm capabilities, and
other functions of scale or scope.229 Indeed, employment losses have often
counted among the strongest reasons against a strict efficiency criterion for
pollution standards.230 There is no algorithm that can solve for indivisibili-
ties.231 The inertia in technological frontier and/or sectoral boundary esti-
mates described above consists in these indivisibilities. Their discovery
typically comes in a bottom-up search focused more on messy, nonstandard
contexts than on long-challenged theorems or their calculus.
Part IV argues that, looking ahead, there is progress still to be made in
improving and broadening the mandate for such searches and specifically
for the use of cost-availability judgments over cost-benefit balancing for
some of our toughest environmental challenges.
IV. IMPROVED COST-AVAILABILITY, MAINSTREAMED
Our statutes’ unique approaches to weighing costs have long included,
implicitly or explicitly, the aim of inducing innovation to better minimize
all costs.232 As the first parts of this essay showed, though, the unpredict-
228. See Ian Steedman, Sraffian Interdependence and Partial Equilibrium Analysis, 12 CAM -
BRIDGE J. ECON. 85 (1988) (showing that Marshall’s partial equilibrium theory fails just from
the assumption of produced inputs).
229. Cf. Kaldor, supra note 171, at 1237 (arguing that equilibrium theory is “barren and R
irrelevant as an apparatus of thought” in its failure to account for increasing returns or for
indivisibilities in production); Herbert E. Scarf, The Allocation of Resources in the Presence of
Indivisibilities, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 111, 115 (1994). Such a value judgment is perfectly coherent
as a matter of first order ethics. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 210-
11 (1993) (arguing that some non-commodity values are “political goods” best secured
through democratic institutions of voice, equity and deliberation). Each of us experiences
our own life as indivisible in this sense even if we perhaps should not. See DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 281-82 (1984).
230. See Driesen, Distributing, supra note 135, at 3; Masur & Posner, supra note 150, at R
695-96; cf. Richard D. Morgenstern, Analyzing the Employment Impacts of Regulation, in DOES
REGULATION KILL JOBS? 33, 37 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2013) (finding in analysis of CAA
and CWA pollution abatement expenditure data that employment showed statistically insig-
nificant increase as expenditures rose).
231. See Scarf, supra note 229, at 116. That is, no algorithm exists to do so simply R
through pricing. Scarf presents an alternative “neighborhood theory” of finding optimality.
See id. at 118-27.
232. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. R
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ability of actual firms and innovation, coupled with the intractability of the
economic concept of cost, has made inducing cost-saving innovations a
rather uncertain enterprise.233 Of course, different policies’ effects on inno-
vation are literally all around us. Ironically, this nexus has become clearest
in the media program vesting the most authority in EPA by its sheer scope
and complexity: the CAA’s MACT standards.234 Defining boundaries for
either of our purposes—identifying a solution or evaluating its costs—has
lately become a treacherous affair for MACT.235 On the one hand, “[t]hat
different industries may be subject to different standards and that [EPA]
need not bear the burden of explaining those differences is clear.”236 On the
other hand, the notion of an available (or ‘achievable’) benchmark presumes
at least some degree of integrity in the comparison’s parameters.237 For ex-
ample, in assessing the best performing facilities from a nationwide sample
where all of the best performers were located in a single state, how should
those leaders be counted against those (ostensible laggards) who faced no
stringent local standards forcing their hand?238 Or in constructing a cate-
gory of HAP emitters, many of whom would eventually face controls im-
233. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. R
234. “Hazardous air pollutants” (HAPs) include virtually all regulated air pollutants—
the exceptions being the criteria pollutants, greenhouse gases, and ozone depleting sub-
stances—and § 112(a) regulates them at relatively low volumetric thresholds. See Martineau,
supra note 91, at 230-35. R
235. EPA has had several MACT standards remanded for insufficient explanation of a
categorization decision. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1257-61
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 947-50 (D.C. Cir.
2004); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 217 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Davis Cty. Solid
Waste Mgnt. v. EPA, 101 F.3d 1395, 1406-11 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The importance of subcat-
egorizing was evident as soon as MACT got underway. Cf. Martineau, supra note 91, at 248: R
The importance of subcategorization cannot be underestimated. The way EPA
subcategorizes, if it does at all, can significantly affect the floor determination for
the source category, and thereby dramatically affect the ultimate MACT standard’s
degree of stringency. If one sector of a particular industry segment has better
pollution control equipment than another segment [sic] in the same source cate-
gory, the highly controlled units will drive the floor determination and thus set a
minimum standard for the rest of the source category.
236. Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 447 n.108 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This has
remained true in the MACT context. See, e.g., U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 656-
57 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (deferring to EPA’s subcategorization of boilers by the fuel types used
even though boilers were permitted to fuel-switch from year-to-year and change categories
of controls as a result).
237. See Masur & Posner, supra note 150, at 682-83. R
238. See Nat’l Ass’n for Surface Finishing v. EPA, 795 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
California’s restrictions on electroplating finishers made them significantly better than their
counterparts elsewhere. See Final Chromium Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 58,230-32. With that data
in hand, once it re-opened the “beyond-the-floor” hexavalent chromium standard, EPA then
found that the costs of mandating California’s stringent filtration standards outweighed the
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posed by a separate but overlapping NSPS standard yet to be finished but
who, when so governed by that NSPS would then drop out of the ‘MACT
pool’ from which costs and technology were being counted,239 how should
EPA count or average those performances? Or from a MACT pool of boil-
ers and industrial furnaces of varying sizes, purposes, feedstocks, and pollu-
tion equipment, some of which controlled certain HAPs well but none of
which controlled all HAPs well, should EPA set MACT floors pollutant by
pollutant or by subcategorizing the sources?240
Each of the above discoveries indicates some kind of endogeneity or de-
pendence. In the first instance, variations in state/local law made the
sources of a sub-jurisdiction into noticeable outliers—yet performance lead-
ers all the same.241 In the second instance, an accident of sequencing in two
overlapping standards drew the boundaries of the performance average into
question.242 Finally, in the last instance, the significance of pollution con-
trol efforts to the overall enterprise forced the standard setter into having to
choose how to compare performances: by production factors or by control
equipment?243 In all three, constructing the benchmark(s) highlighted the
observed technical variations’ social drivers. As we have agreed throughout,
technological frontiers and the possibilities for their extension have always
turned to some degree on policy choices—not solely the invisible hand of
accumulated or projected technical progress. But highlighting the degree to
which the performances driving technology-based standard setting actually
reflect underlying policies draws out the intentional influences (in one form
or another) exerted on the direction and pace of technical change. It also
foregrounds the judgments entailed in constructing the sectoral boundaries
and technological frontiers being used. Section A contrasts two long-run
benefits of doing so nationally, and set the (cost-conscious) beyond-the-floor standards only
after controlling for the California operations statistically. Id. at 58,225-28.
239. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 184-86 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also
U.S. Sugar Corp., 830 F.3d at 593-94.
240. See U.S. Sugar Corp., 830 F.3d at 610-11; see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658,
669 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
241. See Final Chromium Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 58,231-32 (observing that California
restrictions on chromium emissions are achieved with chromium plating and chromic acid
anodizing facilities registering their observed performances at high cost). The related but
distinct issue of using subnational jurisdictions’ permitted emissions levels as evidence of
achievability rightly requires verifying the operation of actual sources within those jurisdic-
tions. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
242. Logically, figuring the costs of a later-in-time standard (if not always its technolog-
ical achievability) will turn on the practical impact upon covered sources of any earlier-in-
time standard(s). See Portland Cement, 665 F.3d at 184-86; see also U.S. Sugar Corp., 830 F.3d
at 593-94.
243. See also Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 880-81 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Cement Kiln
Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 861-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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case studies, the 2015 NSPS for electricity generating units (EGUs) and
their greenhouse gases (GHGs) and EPA’s water intakes rules, to schema-
tize these influences and the judgments they entail. Section B offers some
general lessons for using technology-based standards to induce innovation.
A. The Relevance of Indivisibilities and Endogeneity
EPA often finds that production governed by a performance standard
improves its efficiencies over time.244 There may be no predicting these
improvements. Indeed, it is often impossible to sort out the causes of ob-
served efficiency gains after the fact.245 But for what gains should technol-
ogy-based standards aim? Detecting (or hypothesizing) endogeneity after
the fact is a long way from confidently predicting innovations that will fol-
low from one standard or another. We also concluded above that the real
harms to be avoided in regulation typically stem from indivisibilities in pro-
duction like job losses, stranded capital, etc., and that these all combine to
form a kind of inertia to which the standard setting should be sensitive.246
So-called “transition relief,” e.g., grandfathering, has been a stock response,
although severe difficulties have attended that choice too.247 Finally, if out-
puts remain roughly competitive while inputs, equipment, and/or processes
are shifting, as has been the case in wholesale electricity markets,248 one
mode of production may become significantly disfavored simply for emit-
ting the target pollutant(s). As already mentioned, these challenges inter-
sected in the 2015 NSPS for GHGs from fossil fuel-fired EGUs.
As price increases shift a product’s cost/value ratio, they can eventually
undermine the product itself.249 In that case, keeping the product in the
technological fold may become impossible as better ways of meeting de-
244. Cf. Final Chromium Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 58,231 (concluding that, the mere dis-
covery in a technology review that some facilities using the benchmark solution(s) identified
in an earlier MACT standard are doing better than expected is insufficient reason by itself to
reopen that MACT standard).
245. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. R
246. See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text. R
247. See Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl-Kong, Regulatory Change and Optimal
Transition Relief, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 1581, 1594-621 (2011) (arguing that transition relief can
dampen incentives to anticipate legal change).
248. See Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,524-527.
249. See, e.g., Newell et al., supra note 202 (tracing changes in consumer appliances R
market caused by fluctuating energy costs and the consumer preference changes that re-
sulted); see also Elrod & Malik, supra note 184 (finding evidence that some product switching R
at the establishment level resulted from EPA’s cluster rule).
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mand overtake it. To electricity generation, coal is a produced input250 and,
in most technology-based standard setting, process and input changes have
always been an option.251 As EPA found in its 2015 EGU NSPS, factor
productivity can be so tied to costs that any constraint will decisively favor
alternative inputs.252 Coal-fired EGUs attaining a certain combustion effi-
ciency and capturing their GHG emissions would, according to best esti-
mates, be undersold at wholesale rates by some existing nuclear and
renewable producers and by most existing and future natural gas produc-
ers.253 The innovations shifting coal’s cost/value ratio may or may not have
been independent of regulatory action (although to whatever extent coal’s
other costs were “internalized” by regulation, it was at best a qualified inde-
pendence).254 But an aggregate cost-benefit analysis could logically find
negligible costs caused by the GHG constraint per se.255 Indeed, by EPA’s
projections those same hypothetical future units would still be undersold by
natural gas producers even without the GHG NSPS—especially with con-
tinued low growth in overall demand and subsidized renewable genera-
250. Partial equilibrium modeling of the sector is therefore “wrong” in Pizer and Kopp’s
words, see supra note 39, at least to the extent that that input’s price is affected by demand. R
See Steedman, supra note 228. R
251. In the CWA: See Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 501-02 (2nd Cir.
2005); Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 895 (6th Cir. 2006). In the CAA: See
Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reviewing and affirming EPA’s
assumption that cleaner feedstocks would be substituted); Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653,
656 (7th Cir. 2007).
252. See Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,543-92. Coal’s many costs include vari-
ous air pollutants (sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates, heavy metals and GHGs),
REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 201, at 10-11, water pollutants (cooling water intakes’ impinge- R
ment and entrainment, biocides, acidic and alkaline runoff, sediment, and fly ash) and sub-
stantial post-extraction landscape reclamation. See Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel
to Mountaintop Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21,
24-27 (2004).
253. This resulted from a comparison of cost-at-proposal estimates using the “levelized
cost of electricity” (LCOE)—a summary metric determining the viability of any generating
source. Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,626-28, 64,545-46; see also U.S. EPA, REGULA-
TORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
FROM NEW, MODIFIED, AND RECONSTRUCTED SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS § ES.3
(EPA-452/R-15-005) (2015) [hereinafter RIA FOR EGU NSPS].
254. See Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,628-32 (reviewing NSPS interactions
with other regulatory requirements).
255. See id. at 64,563-64 (noting that EPA considered the costs of its NSPS at the
national and the individual source level). That could be equally true for employment effects,
as well. See Joseph E. Aldy & William A. Pizer, The Employment and Competitiveness Impacts
of Power-Sector Regulations, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 70, 70 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds.,
2013) (finding minimal gross and net employment impacts from various CAA air pollution
control standards in US manufacturing sectors).
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tion.256 Just the capital equipment costs to achieve state-of-the-art heat rate
efficiencies was, as projected, too costly.257 Accounting for existing coal-
fired EGUs’ grandfathering advantages,258 it seemed to EPA that technol-
ogy and the shrinking demand for energy services were combining to cut
new coal generation out of the market.259
A finding of negligible aggregate expected costs (because the factor is
expected to be outcompeted in any event) is not, however, a finding that the
solution identified is cost available.260 Indeed, zero marginal profitability
with that factor could imply the opposite. Yet firms constantly substitute
inputs and physical capital as their cost/value ratios change, often doing so
256. Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,513. This led EPA to the conclusion that its
final NSPS would cause “negligible CO2 emission changes, quantified benefits, and costs by
2022 . . . .” Id. at 64,515. For cost-benefit purposes, that conclusion was decisive and EPA
developed it fully in the RIA. See RIA FOR EGU NSPS, supra note 253, at § 4.1-4.5.5. Expe-
rience thus far, with the CPP stayed judicially, has borne out the projections. See Jack Fitz-
patrick, Coal Plants Are Shutting Down, With or Without the Clean Power Plan, MORNING
CONSULT (May 3, 2016) https://morningconsult.com/2016/05/03/coal-plants-shutting-with-
out-clean-power-plan/.
257. See Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,515, 64,558-62 (LCOE of new integrated
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) units versus alternatives not competitive with NGCC,
competitive with some nuclear); International Energy Agency—Coal Industry Advisory
Board, Power Generation from Coal: Measuring and Reporting Efficiency Performance and CO2
Emissions (2010), [hereinafter Generation from Coal], https://www.iea.org/ciab/papers/
power_generation_from_coal.pdf. The IEA found that global average efficiency rates for
existing coal-fired generating stations was about 33.5% in 1971, had risen only to about 35.1%
by 2007 and that new plants should be >40% efficient, but that capital stock turnover was
unlikely without policy inducement. Id. at 57-61. Unlike its preceding century where coal
combustion grew continuously more efficient, see supra note 161, coal’s present and projected R
future make it what business strategists call a “cost driver” for firms in the business of selling
electricity wholesale. Id. at 45-56 (analyzing fuel variability, ash quality and quantity, carbon
intensity, cooling water demands, and flue gas scrubbing as cost drivers in coal combustion).
258. According to Revesz and Lienke, if not for the vintage-differentiated standards
advantaging “existing” coal-fired EGUs in their conventional pollutant emissions, most of the
Nation’s existing coal-fired EGUs would probably have been shuttered by 2015 because of
those emissions. See REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 201, at 152-54. R
259. See Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,524-25 (noting falling but stable natural
gas prices and underlying technology, market distortions by policy interventions, growing
supply of renewables, and continuing fall in demand relative to population growth).
260. The same forces leading to vertical integration, after all, could leave some large
firms saddled with high costs. See Scarf, supra note 229, at 127. Thus, EPA took care also to R
find the emission standard “achievable” within the meaning of CAA § 111(b). See Final EGU
NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,573 & n.356 [hereinafter “Achievability TSD”], (citing U.S. EPA,
Technical Support Document (TSD): Achievability of the Standard for Newly Constructed
Steam Generating EGUs (EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495-11771), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495-11771).
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only after first movers have shown the way.261 So EPA compared the pro-
jected costs of carbon capture262 plus state-of-the-art heat-rate efficiencies
to the capital costs imposed by past NSPSs and concluded that the expected
costs of partial carbon capture were “reasonable.”263 What constitutes “rea-
sonableness” under this sector’s circumstances, though? According to a
“broad consensus,”264 the sector is undergoing profound shifts along with
the technologies of energy production and consumption.265 EPA’s investiga-
tions confirmed that firms in the wholesale electricity business could and
likely will shift off of coal inputs,266 even for so-called base load de-
mands,267 notwithstanding coal’s long predominance.268 It found that the
261. Technology-based performance standard setting utilizing a “model plant” operating
in a commercial context—assuming some ‘hard luck’ is included in the assumptions—neu-
tralizes arguments that ‘it cannot be done.’ But whether it can be done commercially under
varied circumstances is the issue under both CAA and CWA practice. See supra notes 95-99, R
122 and accompanying text. EPA met the ‘hard luck’ objections to its EGU NSPS’s carbon
capture demonstration establishment at length in its rulemaking. See Final EGU NSPS, 80
Fed. Reg. at 64,556-73.
262. EPA’s model plant running a carbon capture system commercially was a retrofit of
an existing coal-fired EGU. See Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,549.
263. See Achievability TSD, supra note 260, at 5; cf. Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at
64,575 (“Much like carbon capture scrubbers today, the technology to capture and remove
SO2 from power plant flue gases was new to the industry and was not yet widely deployed at
large coal-burning plants when the EPA first promulgated the 1971 [NSPS].”); id. at 64541
(citing Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Given one of the model
plant’s recorded start-up difficulties, EPA reduced the carbon intensity performance rate to
reflect “partial” carbon capture averaged over a 12-month period. See id. at 64,549-50; 64,574.
264. Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,524.
265. See Thomas Covert et al., Will We Ever Stop Using Fossil Fuels?, 30 J. ECON. PERSP.
117, 126-34 (2016).
266. See Final EGU NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,515.
267. Base load is that quantity of supply constantly flowing, regardless of peaking de-
mands. Until important problems with storage are solved, LCOE estimates for wind and
solar will remain higher than those for natural gas, nuclear fission, and even some existing
coal. See RIA FOR EGU NSPS, supra note 253, at 2-1—2-43; Covert, supra note 265, at 127-
31. The increasing adaptability of natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) generation and that
fuel’s superior GHG-to-megawatt ratio, however, is undermining coal’s position regardless
of storage’s technological frontier.
268. See Final Rule—Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,796 (2015) [hereinafter
CPP Final Rule] (noting a continual trend since 2000 of fossil fuel generation shifting from
coal and oil to NGCC units). It is entirely consistent with the CAA as amended that coal-
fired electricity generation could eventually end. Cf. REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 201, at 88- R
111 (noting the progression of restrictions on coal that have followed from CAA implementa-
tion); Craig N. Oren, Struggling for Context: An Appraisal of “Struggling for Air”, 46 ENVTL. L.
REP . 10838, 10838 (2016) (“[C]oncern about the effects of coal-fired power plants and efforts
to control those effects go back at least 25 years, rather than being a ‘War on Coal’ launched
by the Barack Obama Administration.”).
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strongest firms in that market are those selecting the most advantageous
generating, transmission, and distribution factors over the medium- to long-
term.269 Profits turned on their doing so.270 If the advantages of the tech-
nology-based approach are to be pressed fully, “reasonableness” in this con-
text should turn on the precision of the signals being sent throughout a
sector as EPA finds it: every firm will be under competitive pressures of
one sort or another, every firm will be engaged in at least some (incom-
pletely) pragmatic problem-solving.271
The instructive contrast is the water intakes rules. When EPA investi-
gated the sectors utilizing cooling water withdrawn from surface waters of
the United States, it found cost-available engineering solutions only for re-
ducing impingement mortalities, i.e., at the intake, and used those to set an
inclusive performance standard there.272 But among the 1,000+ facilities
covered by its standard, the costs and challenges of retrofitting to reuse
water and/or switching to waterless factors (limiting so-called “entrainment”
mortalities) varied considerably in both magnitude and technical scope.273
Parts of the thermoelectric sector were particularly dependent on high-vol-
ume withdrawals,274 i.e., those segments of it not yet converted to natural
gas combined cycle (NGCC) generation.275 The segments of the industry
not switching to NGCC clearly had powerful motives given all of the
pushes in that direction. Any reason to ignore those frictions, i.e., impose a
dry cooling standard for the whole category, would have had to outweigh or
269. See RIA FOR EGU NSPS, supra note 253, at 2.2.1—2.3.2.
270. As EPA acknowledged in its CPP cost analysis, firms’ switching to NGCC or zero-
emission renewables face important contractual and other indivisibilities at specified facili-
ties and/or turnover rates. See CPP Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,795-802. This was a
“transition cost” that benefit-cost analysts would have otherwise ignored. See Ferris & Mc-
Gartland, supra note 37, at 176-77. CAA § 111(b)’s concern for cost availability kept the R
matter important. See CPP Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,721-36.
271. See Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in Routines, in The FIRM AS A COLLABO-
RATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 106 (Charles Hecksher
& Paul S. Adler eds., 2006).
272. See Revised Final Intakes Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,340-41 (finding that modified
traveling screens are the “best technology available” for reducing impingement mortality at
existing units).
273. See Revised Final Intakes Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,332-34.
274. See id. at 48,356 (noting highly variable costs for retrofitting). “An entity that owns
multiple facilities could be adversely affected because of the cumulative burden of [multiple
costly retrofits].” Id. at 48,399.
275. In a 2015 technology assessment, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
found that installed NGCC capacity is predominantly air-cooled. See U.S. GOVT. ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFF., TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: WATER IN THE ENERGY SECTOR: REDUCING FRESHWATER USE
IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND THERMOELECTRIC POWER PLANT COOLING 43-50 (GAO-15-
545)(2015), [hereinafter “GAO”], http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671913.pdf.
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to exclude them as a consideration.276 Section B shows how that tight a
focus is the signature strength of technology-based standard setting.
B. Pushing a Technological Frontier: Energy
Services in Transition
Costs and cost avoidance are hard to predict at a sectoral scale. The
shift to NGCC, wind, and solar factors currently in progress in wholesale
electricity markets might address GHG and water problems simultane-
ously.277 Indeed, a dry cooling standard in the intakes rules might have
eased much of the thermoelectric sector’s vulnerabilities to drought—which
have been a growing problem in several regions.278 But where the barriers
hindering a fuller conversion to NGCC and/or renewables were to be found
remained uncertain.279 In reality, energy services markets are among the
most complex and least predictable in the world.280 The orthodox answer—
modeling these uncertainties with various subjective probability parameters
in some series of equilibrium algorithms—is a “conceptual, rather than prac-
tical” solution.281 The stock response when the probability estimates prove
wrong is that they were provisional.282 But equilibrium theory’s indiffer-
ence to hard problems of causation like energy demand elasticities283 leaves
276. GAO found from its consultation with experts in the thermoelectric sector that
retrofitting existing facilities with dry cooling or recirculating cooling towers could be pro-
hibitively expensive for several reasons. See GAO, supra note 275, at 44-45 (citing space
availability, pressurized unit incompatibilities and other causes of cost anomalies at certain
establishments).
277. The mix of NGCC-to-renewables phasing out coal is one particular endogeneity
modelers agree might be considerable. See Gillingham et al., supra note 161, at 2736. R
278. See Tidwell et al., supra note 147, at 515; cf. GAO, supra note 275, at 1 (noting water R
stress and drought as the principal justifications for the water withdrawal technology
assessment).
279. See CPP Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,799-802. NGCC capacity’s GHG advan-
tages are in the near- to medium term (phasing out coal), yet wind and solar accounted for
roughly 70% of new capacity in 2015. Id.
280. See Steve Sorrell & John Dimitropoulos, The Rebound Effect: Microeconomic Defini-
tions, Limitations and Extensions, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECONS. 636, 636-38 (2007). Many of the noto-
rious feedback (or “rebound”) effects in energy markets where demand rises as technology
improves efficiency—whether of the single commodity variety. See J. Daniel Khazzoom,
Economic Implications of Mandated Efficiency in Standards for Household Appliances, 1 ENERGY J.
21 (1980), or the multiple commodity variety; Peter H.G. Berkhout et al., Defining the Re-
bound Effect, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 425 (2000)—continue to evade rigorous quantification. Sorrell
& Dimitropoulos, supra note 280, at 645 (conjecturing that such rebound effects are probably
over-estimated).
281. Ferris & McGartland, supra note 37, at 173. R
282. See Gilboa et al., supra note 24, at 175-77 (describing a Bayesian approach to R
probabilities in economic modeling).
283. See Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, supra note 280, at 638-39.
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its users to ignore the very observed “indivisibilities” and nonlinearities so
crucial to finding real cost-avoidance opportunities.284 The technology-
based approach views these discoveries as the basis of expectations that a
standard’s costs can be minimized in actual markets. In the end, the vague-
ness of the economic concept of cost at least permits aiming for as much.285
Before developing his noted theory of induced innovation,286 Sir John
Hicks attempted to rehabilitate some nascent work on uncertainty and
profit begun by Frank Knight and others.287 Hicks argued that profit’s place
as a residual somewhere between (or beyond) wages and rents was a
profound amendment to equilibrium theory so long as it was attributed not
to the act of risk-taking—as Knight and others had argued—but rather to
the profit-taker’s success in having navigated the practical exigencies of pro-
duction in competitive markets.288 On this theory, profits are but the mirror
image of costs in an economy that is constantly churning.289 Equilibrium
modeling presupposes that we can track how our actions guide that churn.
Yet we cannot—leaving a paradox of equilibrium economics to those cost-
284. This may reflect cost-benefit’s use of “cost” as a proxy for harm. A proxy, no matter
how well designed, is always just a proxy. Cf. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 227, at 160 (ac- R
knowledging that certain death is not an infinite utility loss merely because there must be an
infinite willingness to pay to avoid it). But escaping the oversimplified theories of induced
innovation and observing the disparities among industrial sectors combine to discredit the
“notion of a smooth, convex, well-defined [curve] in most microeconomic theorizing in
which the structure of relative factor prices yields a determinate solution to the choice of
technique problem under all circumstances,” ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 233, a notion en- R
trenched in cost-benefit orthodoxy.
285. By definition, the useful life of physical capital eventually comes to an end. Thus,
the CPP’s assumption that generation shifts among affected EGUs could eventually result in
coal’s elimination—barring the use of GHG capture—need not have entailed shifting costs.
Indeed, EPA’s projection of net employment gains from the CPP as monetizable “benefits,”
see CPP Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,928-29, at least implied the assumption that averag-
ing utilities was acceptable. See id. at 64,928 (concluding that employment losses in the
electricity generating sector would be offset by employment gains elsewhere, especially de-
mand-side energy efficiency).
286. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. R
287. See John R. Hicks, The Theory of Uncertainty and Profit, 32 ECONOMICA 170 (1931).
288. See Hicks, supra note 287, 173-87. One can plausibly interpret Knight himself as
having held a similar view. See Stephen F. LeRoy & Larry D. Singell, Jr., Knight on Risk and
Uncertainty, 95 J. POL. ECON. 394, 397-401, 405 (1987). Indeed, even Marshall—the father of
partial equilibrium analyses—allowed that, over a long run control of production could yield
unaccounted-for residuals to the most successful competitors. See BLAUG, supra note 12, at R
354-55.
289. Cf. Brooke, supra note 175, at 230 (Knight’s world was static because the sum of all R
payments to the owners of the factors of production plus entrepreneurial profits was constant
whereas Hicks saw profit stemming from a dynamic economy where all of the above is
churning); BARZEL, supra note 173, at 148 (noting that the “public domain” from which posi-
tive value commodity attributes may be captured and priced is in constant flux).
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benefit champions who think it should calibrate our environmental stan-
dards for us. In reality, technological innovation is both the opportunity to
profit and a cost of trying to do so. As Paul Romer put it,
instructions for working with raw materials are inherently different
from other economic goods. Once the cost of creating a new set of
instructions has been incurred, the instructions can be used over
and over again at no additional cost. Developing new and better
instructions is equivalent to incurring a fixed cost. This property is
taken to be the defining characteristic of technology.290
Technology in this light is both a fixed cost and a means of cost avoidance.
Technological information like this can be costly to produce and/or process,
and how costly it is at any given time depends upon the valence of the
information and the ability of the agent to evaluate and use it.291
The aim of prompting innovation as a consequence of cost avoidance
points to those agents who are already succeeding somehow. Setting any
technology-based standard involves discretionary judgments as to that stan-
dard’s (1) applicability, (2) format, and (3) stringency.292 Most often the
standard will traverse, implicitly or explicitly, the sources’ prevailing in-
puts,293 processes or work practices,294 and any physical capital (for either
production or emissions control)295 in each of these three facets. How real
firms will adjust to the standard and to each other’s reactions—and thus
what market shifts to anticipate—are all uncertain. Ex ante cost estimates
are, for this reason and others, subject to severe confidence limits stemming
from how quickly (and intentionally) the future can diverge from our pro-
jections of it. Experience with technology-based standard setting for new
versus existing sources has not yielded much precise quantification of what
the advantage (e.g., of grandfathering) is worth,296 but it has generally con-
firmed the intuition that market behaviors are often patterned by what
those making capital decisions anticipate from an overall regulatory cli-
290. Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S72 (1990).
291. Cohen, supra note 9, at 195. R
292. See supra notes 77, 156-92 and accompanying text. This is not to say that technol-
ogy-based standard setters will have been aware of these three dimensions (or the informa-
tion needs they entail), see ADLER ET AL., supra note 135, at 164-65, nor of the R
complementarities among them. See Revesz & Westfahl-Kong, supra note 247, at 1615-18 R
(finding that the provision of “transition relief” in vintage-differentiated performance stan-
dards and the stringency of those standards should be decided simultaneously).
293. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. R
294. See supra notes 89 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
296. Cf. Stavins, supra note 142, at 49-56 (concluding that precise valuation of “existing R
source” status not possible from extant data)
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mate.297 For all its complexity, the Obama Administration’s CPP was
grounded in a bottom-up analysis of the costs to incumbent firms and elec-
tricity ratepayers of making cost-available adjustments to extant electricity
generating portfolios, combined with the tools amenable to state use for
lowering the costs of doing so in the aggregate.298 It reflected a technology-
based approach to inducing and supporting innovation in one of our least
predictable markets. The CAA linked the EGU NSPS to the CPP quite
tightly: without it, EPA had no authority to call for CPP plans from partici-
pating states in the first place.299 As the political winds have turned against
the CPP, analytical nuts and bolts within the CPP and EGU NSPS have
been lost, perhaps for good. But the tactics honed in those rulemakings, like
those used in the intakes rules and elsewhere, are not only still serviceable:
they may represent our best hope for finding consensus actions against sys-
temic problems like climate change.
CONCLUSION
Formal cost-benefit analysis has attracted a powerful following and a
powerful critical literature. Understanding cost as a decision factor aligned
against stringency in environmental performance standard setting views
cost as a proxy for harm or damage to production. But mainstream econom-
ics has moved on from that understanding of this essential yet vague con-
cept, as did the unique approach EPA has fashioned to evaluating the costs
of its performance standards in real industrial sectors pursuant to the CAA,
CWA, and similar statutes. EPA’s method, perhaps best characterized as
induced cost avoidance, skips straight to what firms can be doing now and
over the short- to medium-term to minimize all costs of production and
consumption, whether priced or not. This uniquely American approach to
pollution control holds within it a potential we cannot afford to ignore or
consign to the past.
297. See Revesz & Westfahl-Kong, supra note 247, at 1617 (finding that “sequential op- R
timization” in performance standards can distort the relevant comparisons given firms’ own
efforts to avoid costs); Gray & Shadbegian, supra note 159, at 254 (finding weak tendencies R
for existing pulp and paper plants to keep operating where a state’s relative regulatory strin-
gency is low and expected to remain so); Aldy & Pizer, supra note 255, at 85 (finding that
annual volatility in manufacturing sectors was likely much more influential than any regula-
tory costs the firms bore).
298. See CPP Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,663-67. EPA’s “building block” approach to
supporting that transition, (1) improving efficiencies at existing coal facilities, facilitating the
switch (2) to NGCC units and (3) to zero-emitting renewable capacity, made use of per-
formance standards quantified at the national, regional, and individual state levels. See id. at
64,563-82.
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (authorizing EPA to prescribe regulations for existing
sources only if an NSPS would apply “if such existing source were a new source”).
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